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The cover: A print by Kunisada illustrating an episode from Nise Murasaki Inaka Genji (The False Murasaki and the Rustic Genji), a very popular novel written in 38 parts between 1829 and 1842 by Ryutei Tanehiko (1783—1842). Note that the go board is accurately depicted as 19x19, an unusual touch of realism in woodblock prints. This print is very similar to the print given on the cover of GW22, but we hope that faithful readers will appreciate the differences. Collection of Tanaka Fumio.

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Go World News

Otake (Cho has won eight of their ten title match clashes). Poor Otake has been having a bad year: he came last in the Meijin league and his record for the year is an uninspired 13–12.

The results:
Game 1 (4 July). Cho (W) won by resignation.
Game 2 (17 July). Cho (B) won by resignation.
Game 3 (23 July). Cho (W) won by resignation.

Kato Wins First Game of Meijin Title Match
This heading should come as a surprise to anyone who has been following the Japanese go scene this year: what happened to Takemiya? He had led all the way through the league and with six wins after six rounds was two points ahead of the field. Takemiya was confident of becoming the challenger and was predicting to all and sundry that he would make up for his debacle in the Judan title match against Kobayashi.

Then the unbelievable happened. Despite being two points ahead with only two rounds to go, seemingly an almost unassailable position, Takemiya not only failed to become the challenger but did not even make the league playoff. When he lost his final two games, to Cho and Pun, four players tied for first with 6–2 scores, but according to the league rules, in a multiple tie only the two top-ranked players qualify for the playoff. Based on the previous league's results, that meant Cho (ranked number one as the preceding title-holder) and Kato. Even if Kato had lost his last-round game, Ishida Akira would have beaten out Takemiya for the playoff place. Takemiya must have been a very dis-

It feels good to have a title again.

Cho Takes Gosei Title
Cho Chikun did not remain an untitled 9-dan for long: he has already taken the first step on the comeback trail by winning the 11th Gosei title, so he enters his thirties with the respectable minimum of one title to his name. Appropriately enough, he won the third game on his 30th birthday. Cho has almost completely recovered from the serious injuries that he suffered in the traffic accident in January, though he is still continuing a rehabilitation program.

Cho won the title match three straight, thus further improving his career record against Otake (Cho has won eight of their ten title match clashes). Poor Otake has been having a bad year: he came last in the Meijin league and his record for the year is an uninspired 13–12.

11th Meijin League

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Player</th>
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Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.
A dark horse wins the Meijin league race.  
(Cartoon by Ayuzawa Makoto, Go Weekly)

appointed man.

In the playoff, held on 25 August, Kato evoked memories of his old nickname of ‘the killer’ by bringing down a Cho group. He has been enjoying excellent form this year and he went on to defeat Kobayashi Koichi in the first game of the title match, held on 10, 11 September (making his results for the year 23—4).

Late news. The second game, played on 17 and 18 September, was won by Kato.

Ishikura Stars in 11th Kisei Tournament

The dark horse of the 11th Kisei tournament has been Ishikura Noboru, the first 5-dan to reach the semifinals of the final stage. After winning the 5-dan section, Ishikura won four games in a row to reach the semifinal, where he will face either Otake or Kato. Takemiya plays Cho in the other semifinal.

Ishikura is an unusual example of a player who graduated from university (Tokyo University) and got a job with a top company before deciding to throw up his career and devote himself to go. He became a professional in 1980 at the age of 25. He won the Kido ‘new face’ prize in 1981, the 3-dan section of the Kisei in 1982 and the 4-dan section in 1984.

Kobayashi Satoru – revenge is sweet.

Japan Leads in 2nd Japan-China Super Go

The second Super Go match between China and Japan has turned out to be the reverse of the first, with one of the lead-off members of the Japanese team almost demolishing the whole of the opposing team. This time the star has been Kobayashi Satoru 8-dan, who failed to score a win last year. Kobayashi defeated five Chinese players in a row, including a win over Jiang Zhujiu, who caused a panic on the Japanese side last year by beating five of their players. His winning run was finally checked by Ma Xiaochun, the world’s youngest 9-dan, but the Chinese only have Ma and Nie left to cope with the more formidable half of the Japanese team. After Nie’s performance last year, however, no one will be writing off the Chinese team just yet.

Popularity Poll: The Top 15

Earlier this year the Nihon Ki-in magazine Igo Club conducted a poll amongst its readers to find out who were the most popular professionals. It’s interesting to see that the ranking varies quite a bit from the ranking of players by strength given on page 38. Most popular, by a long way, was

Ishikura, the first 5-dan to reach the Kisei semifinals.
Takemiya Masaki, presumably because of his cheerful personality and the big build-up that his large-moyo style has been given in the go press. On the other hand, Cho Chikun, who has to be considered one of the great players of go history, was placed surprisingly low, perhaps because he is not Japanese. The top 15 in the poll, with number of votes received in parentheses, were:

1. Takemiya (287)
2. Kobayashi Koichi (237)
3. Otake Hideo (152)
4. Ishida Yoshio (81)
5. Kato Masao (63)
6. Sakata Eio (61)
7. Fujisawa Shuko (56)
8. Rin Kaiho (50)
9. Cho Chikun (46)
10. Kajiwara Takeo (21)
11. Takagawa Shukaku (19)
12. Hashimoto Shoji (13)
13. Go Seigen (12)
14. Ishida Akira (9)
15. Ogawa Tomoko (9)

News in Brief

Yoda Wins Shinjin-O Title

Yoda Norimoto 6-dan has won the 11th Shinjin-O (king of the new stars) title, defeating O Rissei 8-dan 2–1 in the playoff. This is Yoda’s second Shinjin-O title; he first won it in 1983, when he was 17. For O, who won the title in 1981, this was his last chance, as his recent promotion to 8-dan disqualifies him from further participation.

The final game was played on 8 September.

Rin to Challenge Kato Oza

In a playoff held on 11 September at the Nihon Ki-in, Rin Kaiho defeated Kudo Norio and so won the right to challenge Kato Masao for the 34th Oza title. Rin first challenged for this title in 1966, but lost 1–2 to Sakata; he won the title from Sakata in 1973 (2–1), but lost it to Ishida Yoshio the following year (2–1).

Sonoda Doing Well

Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in has been arousing a lot of interest lately with his ultra-large-moyo fuseki. Sonoda plays a centre-oriented game besides which even the Takemiya ‘cosmic’ style pales a little. On top of that, he has been doing well in tournaments (his results to date this year against Nihon Ki-in players are 11–4). In the 12th Tengen tournament he has beaten Takemiya, Ishida Yoshio, and Kato in turn to reach the final and if he can brush Yamashiro Hiroshi aside will have a chance to test himself against Kobayashi Koichi. He also did well in the Gosei, defeating Hane and Ishida Yoshio, but he lost to Cho in the final. The fuseki of that game, shown below, will give the reader an idea of his style. We hope to present some of his games in a later issue.

Schlemper Wins 1986 European Championship

The 30th European Go Congress was held in Budapest from 19 July to 2 August and attracted 373 participants. For the second year in a row, the European Championship was won by Ronald Schlemper 6-dan of Holland. Schlemper did not lose a game this year or last year, so he now has 18 wins in a row in this tournament. Second place was taken by Frank Janssen 5-dan, also of Holland, with 8–1. Third was Frederic Donzet 5-dan of France on 7–2.

This year’s congress was noteworthy for the participation of a strong East German contingent and of four strong U.S.S.R. players. It marks another step forward in the internationalization of go. Also of note was the visit by Kajiwara Takeo 9-dan, who was making his first trip to Europe. He was accompanied by Nakayama Noriyuki 5-dan, who in recent years has become a legendary figure on the international go stage.
The top place-getters:
1. Ronald Schlemper 6-dan (Holland): 9–0
2. Frank Janssen 5-dan (Holland): 8–1
3. Frederic Donzet (France): 7–2
4. Egbert Rittner 4-dan (West Germany): 6–3
7. Vladimir Danek 5-dan (Czech.): 6–3
8. Andre Moussa 5-dan (France): 6–3
9. Gerald Westhoff 6-dan (Holland): 6–3
10. Rade Petrovic 5-dan (Yugoslavia): 6–3

Manfred Wimmer headed a group of nine players on five points. Yoo Jong-su, the top player resident in Europe, finished way down in 44th place because in an otherwise even-game tournament he was handicapped by having to give five stones to shodans and four stones to 2-dans; he was not matched against the top Europeans players.

International Computer v. Human Wei-Chi'i Competition

The success of the first computer go tournament held in Taipei in December 1985 has encouraged the sponsors to establish an annual title, to be held in Taipei every year on 11 November from 1986 to the year 2000. There are two main sections: computer v. computer (on 9x9 or 13x13 and 19x19 boards) and computer v. human (same size boards). In the computer v. computer division, the first prize in the 9x9 section is NT$100,000 (about $2,500) and double that in the 19x19 section. In the computer v. human section, the champion computer plays a human for a NT$100,000 prize if it wins taking black on a 9x9 board; on 19x19 boards the prize for the computer ranges from NT$100,000 for winning with a 16-stone handicap to NT$40 million (over $1 million) if it can win a best-of-seven series on even. The human concerned is Stan Shih, president of the MSC Group. Games will be played according to the Taiwanese rules.

Sponsors of the tournament are the Ing Chang-Ki Weichi Educational Foundation, the Multitech Industrial Corporation (Taiwan's largest computer manufacturer and a member of the MSC Group) and the Third Wave Publishing Company.

News of this year's tournament will reach readers too late for them to enter this year, but they have until 2000 to get their programs ready. For more information, contact:
Ing Chang-Ki Educational Foundation
4th Floor, 35 South Kuang-fu Rd.,
Taipei, Taiwan
Republic of China

REDUCING TERRITORIAL FRAMEWORKS

Attacking and Defending Moyos
by Shuko Fujisawa

This book is a complete and systematic guide to the techniques involved in reducing moyos or territorial frameworks. In most games, the middle game starts when one player attacks the potential territory mapped out by the other. Such attacks take the form either of invading the enemy's territory or of limiting its potential by reducing it from the outside. This book, which complements the earlier Ishi Press publication Enclosure Josekis, aims not only to provide a reference guide for the standard patterns involved in reducing and defending territory but also to teach you the criteria for determining whether a reducing move or an invasion is called for. It is an essential text for anyone who wants to master middle game fighting.

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Tel. (415) 964-7294
This Judan title match was the first title match between Kobayashi Koichi and Takemiya Masaki and it was billed in the go press as the match that would answer the question of who was currently the strongest player. It was fought between the two players who dominated tournament go last year and look like doing the same this year. One of them will probably agree that the above question has been answered; the other insists that it is still unresolved.

Takemiya and Kobayashi not only have very contrasting go styles but also contrasting personalities. Takemiya is a cheerful optimist, on and off the board; Kobayashi is no pessimist, but he has achieved his success through hard work and persistence. His stubborn, realistic style is the antithesis of Takemiya’s romantic, visionary style.

Takemiya has made no secret of the fact that he does not respect Kobayashi’s tight, territorial go, but getting the better of it is another matter. Winning with a large-moyo strategy is much harder than winning with a territorial strategy; not only is highly accurate positional judgement required but also a well-developed intuition. A mistake of one line in setting up one’s moyo can, if too ambitious, make the moyo vulnerable to an invasion, or, if too conservative, leave one a dozen points behind. For that reason, Shuko has commented about Takemiya that ‘his winning percentage doesn’t do justice to his strength’.

This series certainly does not show Takemiya at his best, but the credit must go to Kobayashi, who found ways to outmanoeuvre him. Before the match began, Kobayashi told a reporter that he had worked out his counter to Takemiya, and his confidence was borne out by the results.

Judan Prize Money

First prize: ¥7,000,000
Second prize: ¥1,400,000
Match fee. Title-holder: ¥1,900,000
Challenger: ¥1,250,000
Game One
White: Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo
Black: Kobayashi Koichi, Kisei, Meijin, Judan & Tengen
Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each.
Played on 6 March 1986 at Hakone.
Commentary by Kato Masao, Oza.

Figure 1 (1-35)
34: ko

Figures 1, 2

Figure 1 (1-35), Kobayashi's counterstrategy
Black 1, 3. Very unusual for Kobayashi. This presumably is the strategy he worked out for Takemiya. The latter naturally replies with a niren-sei of his own.

Judan Titleholders
1st (1962): Hashimoto Utaro 9-dan beat Handa Dogen 9-dan 3-1
2nd (1963): Handa beat Hashimoto 3-1
3rd (1964): Fujisawa Hosai 9-dan beat Handa 3-2
4th (1965): Takagawa Kaku 9-dan beat Hosai 3-1
5th (1966): Sakata Eio 9-dan beat Takagawa 3-1
6th (1968): Sakata beat Hosai 3-2
7th (1968): Sakata beat Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan 3-1
8th (1969): Otake Hideo 8-dan beat Sakata 3-0
9th (1971): Hashimoto Utaro beat Otake 3-2
10th (1972): Sakata beat Hashimoto 3-2
11th (1973): Sakata beat Takagi Shoichi 7-dan 3-0
12th (1974) Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan beat Sakata 3-1
13th (1975): Rin Kaiho 9-dan beat Hashimoto 3-0
14th (1976): Kato Masao 8-dan beat Rin 3-2
15th (1977): Kato beat Sakata 3-0
16th (1978): Kato 9-dan beat Rin 3-1
17th (1979): Kato beat Hashimoto Shoji 3-1
18th (1980): Otake beat Kato 3-2
19th (1981): Otake beat Hashimoto Shoji 3-0
20th (1982): Cho Chikun 9-dan beat Otake 3-1
23rd (1985): Kobayashi beat Otake 3-0
24th (1986): Kobayashi beat Takemiya 3-0

Black 11 stops White from getting a large moyo or at least reduces the scale of any moyo he tries to build.

White 18, 20. Takemiya is not to be denied. A less ambitious player would be satisfied with jumping to ‘a’. Kobayashi must have handled 20 the right way because after the game Takemiya commented that it was a little premature.

White 26. According to Kato, White 1 in Dia. 1 would make better use of White’s marked stones. If Black 2, the result to 12 would be even.

Black 35. The only move. White has no good answer. If White 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, Black uses the cut at 4 to force with 8 and 10, making White quite unhappy.
Demolishing the moyo

Black 39 is another good move. Black easily lives up to 49, but both sides are satisfied with this result. Takemiya is always happy to see his opponent playing on the second line, even when the second line in question happens to have been part of his moyo.

White 50 is the natural move, but apparently Takemiya wasn’t prepared for the severity of Black’s attack with 51 and 53. After the game, he wondered if he shouldn’t have played 50 at 53, but according to Kato, that kind of move would feel slack in the heat of battle. This perhaps indicates that the fierce fight that flares up here is inevitable.

White 62 permits Black 63, but White has a counter prepared with 64. This leads to a furikawari (trade). If instead White played 62 at 1 in Dia. 3, the continuation to 9 would be likely. White connects his group, and Black has to live in the centre. Instead of 6 in Dia. 3, Black could also play more aggressively with 1 in Dia. 4. This leads to a ko, but if White wins it, Black’s corner is endangered.

White 66. If at 1 in Dia. 5, a ko results, but Black gets better shape on the outside than in Dia. 4.

With 68, the fight seems to come to a peaceful conclusion, but it is not long before it flares up again.

Black 69 is not only a big move in itself but it also has a connection with the centre fight. If White were to play 69, White ‘a’ would become sente, which in turn would make White ‘b’ more severe.

Figure 2 (36 – 70). Demolishing the moyo

Black 39 is another good move. Black easily lives up to 49, but both sides are satisfied with this result. Takemiya is always happy to see his opponent playing on the second line, even when the second line in question happens to have been part of his moyo.

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Black 69 is not only a big move in itself but it also has a connection with the centre fight. If White were to play 69, White ‘a’ would become sente, which in turn would make White ‘b’ more severe.
White 76 is a mistake. Kato's explanation is a high-level one, but we give it for reference. He maintains that White should first force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 6 (the reason for 1 is to make 'a' sente in case Black switches 20 to 21). The continuation from 5 is the same as in the game, but after 12 White must play 13, as this is the crucial point. The continuation to 23 would then give an even game.

White 82. Kobayashi overlooked this move or at least underestimated its severity. However, Takemiya's next move loses the game. White 84 must be at 85 (as in Dia. 6). Black 85 turns out to be extremely effective.

Black 91 and 93 are a clever follow-up to 85. White cannot connect in answer to 93. If at 1 in Dia. 7, Black plays 2 etc. After 10, White gets a ladder with 'a', but Black sets up a geta with 'b'.

Black 99. A calm move. If Black secures the centre group, there is no danger of White's engineering a double attack on it and the group on the side. (For example, if White gets a stone at 'c', Black loses the geta in Dia. 7.)

The game is over after Black 95.

Figure 4 (101 – 145). A bad beginning for Takemiya

Black 1. If at 7, White plays 5; Black then turns at 'a' and should be able to save his group, but sacrificing three stones with 1 to 7 is simplest.

Black 11. The more solid move at 22 would also be good enough.

Black 21 at 24 gives White too big a centre after White 22, Black 27, White 'b'.

White 42 and Black 43 are miai. White resigns after Black 145.

(Adapted from 'Kido', May 1986 and the Sankei newspaper.)

In a critique of the Judan title match, Otake commented favourably on the boldness of Kobayashi's strategy with 69 in Figure 2 and 71 in Figure 3. According to Otake, not only does Kobayashi's go have a rhythm which at present is flowing perfectly, he also possesses the knack of upsetting the rhythm of his opponent. This game is a good example.

Game Two

White: Kobayashi Koichi
Black: Takemiya Masaki


Kobayashi is known for his fondness for a few set fuseki patterns, but he also experiments on
occasion. Unfortunately, his experiment in this game met with a similar reception from other professionals to his early invasion in the second game of the Kisei title match. In other words, not many of them will be imitating it.

**Figure 1 (1—43).** *Kobayashi’s unorthodox fuseki*

White 2, 4. Even with white Kobayashi plays a niren-sei. Throughout this series he played all his opening stones on the star-points.

**White 14.** If at ‘a’, Black will get a chance to set up a moyo by repeating the joseki in the top right corner. Also, White 14 aims at invading at ‘b’.

**White 18.** An interesting move. White aims at cutting with ‘c’ or attacking at ‘d’.

**Black 19.** The slowest move of the game. Takemiya thought for 61 minutes, presumably working out his counter to 20.

**White 20.** The most difficult point of this game. White could instead play patiently at ‘e’. His strategy here looks just a little unreasonable when Black counters with the severe invasion at 23. Once having played 20, however, White 22 at ‘e’ would just invite Black to play at ‘f’.

**White 24.** Goes against accepted theory. The standard move in this kind of position is 1 in Dia. 1. The result to 7 is satisfactory for White. Black might counter with 2 in Dia. 2, leading to a more difficult fight. After 13, White will have to find a way to cope with Black ‘a’ (Black might even cut there with 10), but this does not alter the fact that White 1 is usually considered the only move. Kobayashi has the courage to disregard the conventional wisdom of go, but in this case it gets him into trouble.

**White 26.** White usually only plays 24 when he can hane next at 1 in Dia. 3, but here he has no answer to Black 2. White is in trouble after 3 to 8. If White ‘a’, Black squeezes with ‘b’, which is bad for White; if instead White ‘c’, Black counters with ‘d’.

**White 28.** White has little choice, but permitting Black 29 is painful. After the game, Takemiya was rather critical of Kobayashi’s play here. At the time he must have thought that he was headed for an easy win.

**White 30.** White would like to wedge in at 1 in Dia. 4, but he would not be happy with the result to 10. Black’s wall helps his moyo on the right; he also gets a sente move at ‘a’.

**Black 33, 35.** Black decides to simplify. This makes miai of the hane at ‘g’ and the invasion at 43.

**White 38.** Painfully submissive but necessary — proof that White has played bad shape.

**Figure 2 (44—76).** *Takemiya lets Kobayashi off the hook.***

White 46. White could hardly block at ‘a’.
The opening fight comes to a conclusion with 51. There was a difference of opinion between the players about this result. Takemiya was convinced that it was a success for Black, but Kobayashi maintained that his next move, 52, made a game of it. The professional consensus favoured Takemiya.

White 52. If Black answers at 54, White will connect at 'b', the aim being to make Black heavy.

Black 53. Takemiya regretted not exchanging Black 54 for White before playing 53. White would then have to play 'c', so Black could switch to 55 and 57. Black 54 would create some useful aji, whereas White makes nice thickness with 54.

White 58. The only point.

Black 63 is a little slack. He should first play 1 in Dia. 5. This way White would be compelled to play 'c', so Black could switch to 55 and 57. Black 54 would create some useful aji, whereas White makes nice thickness with 54.

White 58. The only point.

Black 63 is a little slack. He should first play 1 in Dia. 5. This way White would be compelled to answer Black 3 at 4 (Black 4 would wreck his eye shape). Black gets a better result up to 9 than in the figure. If next White 'a', Black can play 'b' in sente; if instead White 'c', Black 'd' becomes a good move. For this reason White would follow Dia. 6. White 6 is a tesuji for creating eye shape.

After 9, White can't do anything immediately with his two stones on the outside, so the result is reasonable for Black. Instead of 7 —

Dia. 7. If Black 1 and 3, the clever combination of 4 and 6 puts Black on the spot. Because of the defects in his shape, he can't continue his attack.

The combination of Black's slack move at 63 and his mistake at 53 has let White get back into the game. Kobayashi now sets out to win it with the bold moves of 74 and 76.

When Black pushes along at 77, White plays all-out, securing his corner with 78 instead of defending in the centre. Takemiya seems to get a fine attack going there with 79 and 81.

The flow of the game changes after Black 91. Before seeing how it changes, let's look at what Black should have done. After first forcing with 93, 95, and 'a', Black should invade the top left corner at 'b'. This brilliant move was discovered by Fujisawa Shuko, who was following the game in Tokyo. The clever thing about this idea is not preceding it with a placement at 'c'.

Dia. 8 (next page). If White answers Black 1 at 2, Black escapes with 3 to 11. If next White 'a', Black 'b' is sente, forcing White 'c', so Black easily links up with 'd'. Next, White might try to reduce Black's moyo on the right with 12 (he can't go in any deeper), but Black defends at 13 and leads by ten points on the board.

Dia. 9. If White blocks at 2, White lives with 3 and 5.
Dia. 8

Dia. 9

Dia. 10

Dia. 11

Dia. 10. If White blocks on this side with 2, Black counters with 3 and 5. After 6 and 8, Black links up with 9 and 11. If next White ‘a’, Black cuts with ‘b’, and White can’t cut because of his shortage of liberties.

Shuko may be nearing retirement, but his ability to spot tesujis like this at a glance shows why he was number one for so long. If Takemiya had seen this invasion, the game would probably have had a different result.

Takemiya played 91 because he was worried about the threat of White 1 in Dia. 11. However, if we assume that Black had used 91 to follow Dia. 8, then he can counter with 2 and 4 in this diagram. He sets up a splitting attack with 6 to 10, so White can’t hope to save both his groups.

White 92 changes the balance of power in the centre, as it weakens the black group to its left. Provoking this move with 91 handicaps White in the fighting that ensues in the centre.

Black 97 looks aggressive, but the first thing Takemiya said after the game was that it was a wasted move. White makes skilful use of the stone he has already played at 92 to cut off four black stones.

Figure 4 (101 – 136)

5: connects

Black is forced to take the ko at 3, but that only helps White to repair the defect in his shape with 4. That in turn makes 97 in Figure 3 a wasted move. This game demonstrates once again that Kobayashi is a master of the complicated infighting of the middle game.

Black 5 is too small: it is the losing move. Black should play at 8, capturing the white stone on a large scale. That would make a game of it.

White 6 defends against Black ‘a’ in sente. White then plays 8 in sente before locking up the left side with 10. He is now confident of victory.

Black 13 is Takemiya’s last challenge, but he cannot expect to live unconditionally now that White has added stones on the outside.

White 20. White decides to give up the corner in exchange for the outside black group. White 24 and 26 simplify the game and set the seal on victory.

Black 27. Black has no choice. If at ‘b’, White exchanges ‘c’ for Black 35 (if 35 at 36,
White crawls at 35, then cuts at 27.

**Figure 5 (137 – 192)**

A bitter defeat

White 48 is important. If White captures with 1 in Dia. 12, Black gets a ko with 2 and 4.

White 78. Correct timing. If White plays 82 and 84 first, then Black will answer White 78 at 'a', gaining a point.

When Black resigns, the game is close on the board. Takemiya was unable to hide his chagrin at losing. 'Terrible, terrible,' he moaned repeatedly. Then he pointed to the white stones from 24 to 32 (in Figure 1) and said: 'Losing to a sequence like that is terrible.' Takemiya may have deserved to win on the basis of his superior fuseki, but Kobayashi prevailed because of his superior determination. He had the patience to wait for his chance. When it came, he didn't let it slip.

Black resigns after White 192.

(From the Sankei newspaper)

A severe setback for Takemiya – the psychological blow he suffered from losing a game that had looked like an easy win for him probably had a decisive effect on the series.

At the welcome party held by the sponsors in Takasaki the night before the game, Takemiya did not restrict himself to the usual platitudes. In reply to a welcome speech in which the speaker assumed that he and Kobayashi must, as fellow Kitani disciples, be on good terms, he commented: 'It was said earlier that we are good friends, but that's an absurd misunderstanding. It so happens that I have lost two games in a row, but that's because my brain waves have been disturbed by the confident way that Kobayashi plays. He places the stone just as confidently even when making an awful move. Tomorrow I intend to play more calmly and not let that upset me.'

Kobayashi just reacted with a wry grin. In his speech, he replied: 'Two wins in a row was how I planned it. Tomorrow I'm going to finish off the series so that I can relax a little.'

It would be an exaggeration to say that there is bad blood between these two, but it is well known in the go world that they don’t get on very well. Besides the conflict in go philosophy, there seems to be a clash of temperaments. When not playing, they spend no time together, and they also wind up the postgame analyses as soon as possible (none went over half an hour in this series).

Game Three

**White:** Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

**Black:** Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 46). The sanren-sei decoy

Black 1 and 3 round off a star-point series for Kobayashi.

Black 7. Black ‘a’ is more common, especially if one intends to set up a moyo. If White plays 8 at 1 in Dia. 1, then after the joseki to 8, the marked black stone would obviously be better located at ‘a’. Even if Black plays 2 at ‘b’, the marked stone is not in the best position (in that case, Black ‘c’–White ‘d’–Black ‘e’ would be ideal). Presumably Takemiya’s reason for not playing 1 is that he did not want Black to tenuki and switch to ‘b’ in the figure.

Black 9. Kobayashi plays Takemiya’s favourite pattern, but his next move shows that his sanren-sei is a decoy. Instead of building it up and using it as influence, he uses it to prevent White from following a moyo strategy. His real aim is to develop the top.

Black 11. Black plays the narrow pincer at ‘c’ when he wants to build a large moyo. This leads to the familiar joseki in Dia. 2, which Takemiya would play without hesitation.

When Black plays 11 and White enters at 12, Black gets his main territory at the top. Permitting White 20 and 22 would be contradictory if Black were intending to build up a moyo based on his sanren-sei. One can also see now why Kobayashi played the low move at 7.

Black 21. Takemiya would probably push along with 1 etc. in Dia. 3 (7 could also be at ‘a’). After 22 there is no inevitability about the location of 9, which is why it seems plausible to call it a decoy. Concerning Kobayashi’s recent use of the star-point, Takagi Shoichi 9-dan comments: ‘Kobayashi’s star-point plays are of the same nature as Go Seigen’s: the aim is speedy development.’

White 24 was regretted by Takemiya. One’s first instinct is to attach at 1 in Dia. 4. If 2 to 5, then this makes it easy for White to play a sacrifice at ‘a’. This way the top left swells
However, Black is bound to counter with 2 in Dia. 5. Takemiya said that he didn’t like the prospect of Black’s resistance with 8. However, the result to 25 seems reasonable for White, as next ‘a’ and ‘b’ are miai.

Kobayashi commented that he intended to follow Dia. 6 with 6 in Dia. 5. In that case, extending at 5 give White a more efficient shape than in the figure. ‘I didn’t read enough,’ lamented Takemiya.

Black 25 was much praised by Ishida and Kudo Norio, the referee. It combines well with Black’s floating stone at 9, his only stone in an unsatisfactory position. In this respect, it is superior to a small or large knight’s move on the right side. Black 25 not only secures the corner but also makes the best balance with the bottom as well as with the side. Black 7 is now better located than a stone at ‘a’ would be. It’s possible that Kobayashi planned this whole opening, as up to 25 he only used nine minutes.

White 28 is thoughtless. White expected Black 31, but Black seizes the opportunity to make him heavy by pushing at 29. White should have played lightly at 1 in Dia. 7; if Black 2, he could open up a new battle front with 3. If Black plays 2 in Dia. 8, White plays 3 etc. for a result far superior to that in the figure. Black might use 6 here to cut at 1 in Dia. 9, but, as Kobayashi pointed out after the game, White can use the peep at 6 to settle his group. The conclusion is that Black had to follow Dia. 7.

It was probably with a heavy heart that Takemiya played 30. White has no choice, but these stones have now become a considerable burden. White 32 does not secure eye shape.

White 34. White would like to attach at 1 in Dia. 10, but in this position Black simply captures with 2 and 4, as White can’t play ‘a’ after 6 (he collapses after Black ‘b’). White is therefore forced to push up at 34, but he must have felt like crying on seeing Black 35. The latter move kills three birds with one stone: it steals White’s eye shape, strengthens Black’s group, and takes a lot of profit. White has to beat a forlorn retreat into the centre with 36.

Black 37 follows the proverb, ‘Attach at the centre of a symmetrical shape’. If White counters at ‘d’ or ‘e’, Black makes a two-step hane: this would just make it easier for Black to settle himself.

White 40 to 46 are the true Takemiya style, building thickness to attack the black stones below, but perhaps he gives Black too much territory at the top. Ishida suggests that White 1 in Dia. 11 (next page) might be preferable.
Figure 2 (47 – 100). Kobayashi takes control.

White 48. Takemiya: ‘Perhaps I should have forced with 1 to 5 in Dia. 12.’ If Black 6, White certainly gains, but the problem is that Black might counter with 1 to 9 in Dia. 13, making miai of Black ‘a’—White ‘b’—Black ‘c’ and the hane at ‘d’. Playing bad-aji sequences is not the Takemiya style. Whatever the position, he plays moves that are open and forthright.

Black 49 defends against Dia. 12. Black then defiantly hanes at 51, counting on the fact that White has no good way to attack him. If, for example, White 1 and 3 in Dia. 14, Black 4 is the vital point for eye shape. Black is alive after 6. White 5 at ‘a’ would be too thin.

The black group is safe after 55. White 62 was the last move before lunch. The fast pace was owing to the fact that Kobayashi had used only 49 minutes in the morning session (to Take-miya’s one hour 50 minutes).

White 64. A tesuji worth remembering. At the cost of one stone, White closes off the corner in sente. The contrast with White 65—Black 64 hardly needs to be emphasized.

White 70 and Black 71 are miai. If White ‘a’, Black plays ‘b’.

White 74 and 76 offer support to the weak white group below and also aim at severing Black’s connection on the left. Black replies very tightly with 77. If Black went for thickness with 77 at 78, White would answer at 77: these two points are also miai.

White 80 is the biggest move, but Black is not worried about his group. Black 83 can be considered a declaration of victory.

When White cuts the group off with 84, Black has the counter of 85 prepared. If White blocked at 89 with 84, Black would atari at ‘c’.

– 16 –
Black 89 and 91 secure an eye on the side while also setting up the endgame move of ‘d’. Blocking at ‘d’ might look like sente for White, but Dia. 15 shows that it is not. White 1 and 3 seem to turn this into a false eye, but Black answers the throw-in at 5 by connecting at 6. If White then captures four stones, Black recaptures two stones with the ‘under the stones’ tesuji.

Black 93 makes sure of the second eye. White has gained nothing from his attack.

White 98. If at 99, Black counters as in Dia. 16. White 3 at ‘a’ would be too thin.

Black is about ten points ahead on the board.

Figure 3 (101 - 133)

28, 31: ko

Figure 3 (101 - 133). No chink in Kobayashi’s armour

White 4. White would very much like to attach at 1 in Dia. 17 but is hampered by the weakness of his group below. If Black ‘a’, White can cut at ‘b’, but Black will first attack at 2; in the ensuing fight he is bound to get a chance to play ‘c’ in sente, which refutes White ‘b’.

Black 5. Kobayashi: ‘Defending here secures the win.’

White 22, 24. The only place left to fight, but the result to 33 only widens the gap. Actually White could have won the ko if he had used 46 and 48 in the next figure as ko threats instead of 32, but Black would have kept his lead by closing off the top with ‘a’ (White ‘b’ and Black ‘c’ follow).

Figure 4 (134 - 189). Third year as Judan

This game followed the pattern of Kobayashi’s recent winning games. Once he takes a lead, he sets about simplifying the game and starting the endgame as early as possible.

In contrast to Takemiya, who tries to play on as large a scale as possible and who likes a wide-open game, Kobayashi tries to reduce the scale and openness of the position. Konishi theorizes that what he is trying to do is to simplify the infinite complexity of go into something that he can get to grips with and analyse. He tries to reduce the small universe of the game into something that can be fitted into patterns. This leads him into emphasizing the corners and the sides; he tries to turn the centre into a worthless area where neither side can make points. This certainly makes the game more tangible and approachable, although there are professionals
Kobayashi in a characteristic pose after defending his title. Takemiya doesn't look very happy about his shut-out. Kobayashi now has nine straight wins in Judan title matches. His next target is surpassing Kato's record of four Judan titles in a row.

who are not enthusiastic about his reductive approach.

Be that as it may, this game and the first game of the title match show Kobayashi at his peak. As long as he plays like this, it's going to be difficult for anyone to challenge his supremacy.

White resigns after Black 189.


1985 Move of the Year

If you can solve the problem on the right, you may be ready to take your place in the Meijin and Honinbo leagues. Black has just played the marked stone. White has to live either on the side or in the centre to be in the game. He wants to exploit the aji of his sente moves at 'a' and 'b' (the black stone here is a pivotal stone which Black can't sacrifice). White could just extend at 'c', but he wants to do better.

White in this game was O Meien 6-dan, who made history last year with his simultaneous debut in the Honinbo and Meijin leagues (he was given a rough time in the leagues, but very few players do well their first time in a league).

In 1985, Kido instituted a prize of ¥300,000 for the best move of the year. The judges were Sakata Eio, Fujisawa Shuko, and Ishida Akira,
the last being charged with the duty of making monthly selections of outstanding moves. For this purpose, Ishida looked at over a thousand professional games during the year.

The winner, announced in the December issue of *Kido*, was O Meien, who has been acquiring a bit of a reputation for the sharpness of his play. Before looking at the move of the year, here are two other positions from his games that made the monthly selections this year.

**Problem 2.** Black (O Meien) seems to be in bad trouble. White threatens either to set up a geta with 'a' through 'e' or to get a ladder with 'f'. However, O's opponent resigned after O's next move. Can you find it?

*Answers on page 21.*

*Problem 3.* Black to play. In this position from his Meijin league game with Cho Chikun, O came up with a completely new concept in the Chinese-style fuseki. The usual moves are 'a' and 'b'. O lost this game, but Cho gave his new move the seal of approval by using it himself.

**Tesuji Problems**
by Kano Yoshinori 9-dan

1. Black to play and save his stones.

2. Black to play. What is the endgame tesuji?

3. What is the best way to extricate the marked black stones?

4. How can Black save his three 'captured' stones?

*Answers on page 20.*
Tesuji Problems: Answers

Answer to Problem 1
Dia. 1. Cutting at 1 is the only move. Playing an atari at 3 next before extending at 5 is important. Black then captures the two stones on the side with 7 and saves his own stones. Instead of 3 –

Dia. 1: correct
Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. Simply extending at 3 here lets White capture two stones. This is unsatisfactory.

Answer to Problem 2
Dia. 1. The key point here is the location of the marked white stones. The best Black can do is to attach at 1. After the sequence to 6, Black ‘a’ is a big move.

Dia. 1: correct
Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. Cutting at 1 does not work because of the marked stones. White plays the two-step hane tesuji of 6, enabling him to capture Black.

Answer to Problem 3
Dia. 1. Attaching on the side of the white stone with 1 is the tesuji. White cannot play 2 at 3 because Black counters with ‘a’. White has to make himself heavy with 2, so Black can look forward to attacking him.

Dia. 2. Pushing through and cutting with 1 and 3 is crude. The atari at 8 helps White to settle his group – compare this result to Dia. 1. Black 1 at ‘a’ is also bad, as it would make Black heavy; White crawls at 5 in reply.

Answer to Problem 4
Dia. 1. Black starts with 1, then plays the two-step hane tesuji of 3 and 5. The forced sequence to 11 sets up a ladder. (If the ladder is unfavourable, Black can get a ko by playing 11 one line below.)

Dia. 1: correct
Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. Black 1 is too slow: White escapes.

('Igo Club', July & August 1986)

Endgame Problem

If White plays ordinary endgame moves in the above position, he loses (by two points). After confirming this, see if you can find two endgame tesujis that transform the position into a win for White (by one point).

Answer on page 25.
The best move of the year was White 1. Wedging into Black’s corner position like this is more interesting than simply extending at ‘a’.

Dia. 1. If Black answers on the side at 1, White plays 2 and 4 in sente, then uses his aji in the centre, settling his group there with 6 to 12. He would be satisfied with this result. Instead of 3 —

Dia. 2. If Black connects at 1, White plays 2 etc., settling his group on the side. Black can’t capture him after 14.

Dia. 3. Black was dissatisfied with the previous two diagrams, so he atariied on the other side with 1. He gets a big centre, but White still has the aji of the cut at ‘a’, and also the hane at ‘b’ and the aji of cutting at ‘c’. White is also satisfied with this result.

Dia. 4 If White simply peeps at 1, Black gets very good aji by connecting solidly at 2. The comparison makes the virtues of the wedging move quite clear.

Of the three judges, Fujisawa Shuko was particularly taken with O Meien’s move and pushed strongly for its selection. His impression was that it was not a spur-of-the-moment tesuji but one that O had been planning for some time in the centre fight. If so, that makes it all the more commendable.

The game in which this tesuji appeared was played in the 23rd Judan tournament. The actual date was 8 November 1984, but because it was published in the 1985 January issue of *Kido*, it was eligible for the 1985 prize. To show how this move affected the flow of play, we present the whole game on the next page. Black was Sugiu-chi Masao 9-dan.

*O Meien*
Figure 1 (1 – 66). The game started as a moyo contest, but once White took the centre point with 14 his moyo became larger in scale, so Black had to invade. However, he missed the crucial strategic point with 21. As Go Seigen pointed out to O, this move had to be at 38. When White failed to take that point himself with 28, Black got a second chance with 29 but again missed it.

After White made his diversionary attack with 32, the focus of the game became the role of these stones: would they work effectively or could Black turn them into bad moves? On the face of it, a shoulder hit on the 5th line is bad as it helps the opponent to make territory, but in this game the centre fight takes priority.

Figure 2 (67 – 100). After the success of White’s manoeuvre in the bottom right corner, the game was evenly poised. The final clash was precipitated by White’s invasion at 84.

White 94 was stupid: it lost White the sequence shown in Dia. 1 for 98. After White 11, the four black stones cannot escape. In effect, White played 3 at ‘a’ with 94. However, Black also slipped up soon after. If he had played 99 at 1 in Dia. 2, White’s attack would have fizzled out.

Figure 3 (101 – 140). The game remained close until Black 21. If he had taken the opportunity to play 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, he would have
had a good chance of winning. If next White ‘a’, Black could resist with ‘b’, White ‘c’ Black ‘d’. White 22 won the game: White 4 in Dia. 4 is now sente, so White can counter with 6.

White was now ahead by the komi, so Black resigned after 140.

Answer to Problem 2

Black 1 seized victory with one blow — it is the only move that defends against White’s double threats of a ladder and a geta. O’s opponent, Komatsu Hideki 5-dan, promptly resigned rather than sully the game record with foredoomed resistance.

Dia. 1. White’s problem is that his seven cutoff stones only have three liberties. Before Black played the marked stone, White was hoping to get a ladder with 2 or to set up a geta with White 3. The marked stone foils both these threats; it is the kind of tesuji more commonly seen in artificial problems than in actual play.

First of all, it is easy to see that the marked stone stops White from setting up a geta with 1 to 5.

Dia. 2. The marked stone likewise stands in the way of White’s ladder. White runs out of steam after Black 10. If White plays 7 at ‘a’, Black answers with Black 7, White ‘b’, Black 9. White might also try other moves with 3, but nothing works.

The record of the game, which was one hectic fight from beginning to end, is given on the next page. Actually it was lost for Black after White hit him with 40 and 42 in Figure 1, but White made an overplay with 54. A diagonal con-
White: Komatsu Hideki 5-dan; Black: O Meien 6-dan. 11th Shinjin-O tournament (13 Nov. 1985)

Figure 2 (51 – 103)
53: connects; 78: connects; 81: connects

Answer to Problem 3
The move O played against Cho was Black 1. This represents a radical revision of the underlying philosophy of the Chinese-style fuseki. The standard moves to date have been Black ‘a’ and ‘b’, which Black follows up with ‘c’ at the bottom, the idea being to emphasize the bottom right corner. Capping at ‘d’ instead of 1 has been seen, but this is the first time that the cap at 1 has appeared in professional play.

Dia. 1
Dia. 1. Cho answered by sliding to 1, so O was able to seal off the top centre with 2. The focal point of his moyo has switched to the top right. This result makes very efficient use of the marked black stone.

White would like to jump to 2 with 1, but then Black would make him heavy by attacking with Black ‘a’, White ‘b’, Black ‘c’ — not an interesting development for White. We will have to wait for further research to see whether there are alternatives to White 1, but it can safely be said that 2 gives Black a satisfactory result.

Dia. 2. One possibility is for White to block
at 1. If Black caps at 2, White attaches at 3. If Black answers with 4 at 9, White connects at 4, getting a superior result to sliding to White 'a'.

The continuation to 9 here is more or less forced. If Black plays 'b' immediately, White 'c' is a tesuji for forestalling the ladder. Consequently, Black will continue with 'd', White 'e', Black 'f'. It's not easy to evaluate this variation.

Dia. 3. Black 2 is a good answer to 1; it more or less blocks off the centre. If Black can seal White in, then his extension at the centre top works well and he gets a good position.

That being so, White 1 cannot be considered a good counter. O Meien's innovation has opened up previously unexplored territory in the Chinese-style fuseki pattern by completely changing the direction of the moyo.

**Figure 1.** After being blocked off from the centre with 11 and 13, 14 was probably the best move White had. Black 15 prevented White from pressing at 'a'; Black 17 presumably was aiming at 'b'.

It's hard to way whether 19 and 21 were good or bad, but they were very tenacious moves: O was attempting to take charge of the game. A long, drawn-out struggle followed, ending in a half-point victory for Cho after 330 moves.

(Note: The analysis of Problem 1 was by Ishida Akira, that of 2 and 3 by Takagi Shoichi, who is charged with making the selections during 1986. From 'Kido', January and June 1986. Translated by John Power.)

**Endgame Problem:** Answer

**Dia. 1:** wrong

**Dia. 2:** correct

(Dia. 1. This is what happens when White plays an unimaginative endgame: he loses by 2 points.

Dia. 2. The situation is radically improved when White uses his head a little. First, the cut at 1 gains two points: Black has to play an extra stone inside and can't play in at 'a'. The placement at 5 is the correct endgame move in the upper right: it gains another point and steals the game from Black.

('Kido', June 1986)
41st Honinbo Title

A victory by the challenger Yamashiro Hiroshi in the 1986 Honinbo title match would have been significant for several reasons. Most important, it would have represented a breakthrough for the post-Cho generation: so far no player younger than Cho has taken a top title (the best effort has been Kataoka's two terms as Tengen). Secondly, it would have been the first top title for the Chubu or Central Japan branch of the Nihon Ki-in, which has its headquarters in Nagoya. Thirdly, it would have broken the title monopoly enjoyed by Kitani disciples since Takemiya took the Honinbo title from Rin. The failure of the new generation of younger players to fight its way to the summit of the go world is perhaps an indication of what a vital role in training future champions was played by the Kitani school, of which Cho was the last disciple.

Of course, a more important factor than all the above in motivating Yamashiro would have been his personal ambition. He made a spectacular debut by winning a place in the Meijin league at the age of 20 (then a record), and for the last two years has been one of the small handful of players with places in both leagues, but so far he cannot really be said to have fulfilled his potential. This was his first big chance, and his excellent play in the league, in which he scored 6–1 (league chart given in GW43, page 4), indicated that he might be ready to take advantage of it.

The only problem was that Takemiya was equally motivated to defend his title. Not only did he want to make up for his dismal performance in the Judan title match, he was also keen to discard his reputation for not being able to hang on to his titles. He is the only player ever to make two comebacks to a top title, but he would probably prefer not to extend that record.

Before this match, Yamashiro had played Takemiya ten times. Although he had won three of their four games in the last couple of years, he lost six in a row before that, for an overall record of 3–7. Yamashiro commented before the match that his go had improved recently, especially his fuseki, and that he had gained confidence, but he was not over-optimistic about his chances against Takemiya. ‘Takemiya uses the whole board dynamically,’ he said. ‘The problem for me will be my games with white Will I be able to make a game of it?’ Unlike Takemiya, Yamashiro does not have a strongly individual style — rather, he tends to adapt himself to his opponent — but he is known for his tenacity. He may not have won, but he did cause Takemiya a lot of trouble before he was through.

Game One
White: Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo
Black: Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan
Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each.

Takemiya is best known for his sanren-sei with black, but Otake points out that the real fascin-
ation of his style lies in the way he fights with white. His centre-oriented play is, of necessity, backed by considerable fighting strength.

In this first game of the series, Yamashiro tried to match Takemiya’s strength right from the beginning, but this strategy rebounded on him. In the middle game, he had a losing game but the feature of his play is his pertinacity and reluctance to admit defeat. He waited for a chance to make a counterattack and at one stage did upset Takemiya’s lead. If he had had more time, the game might have had a different result.

Incidentally, the reader should find this a good game for life-and-death study: a couple of interesting positions crop up.

Figure 1 (1 – 40).

Figure 1 (1 – 40). *The genius of Takemiya*

White 14 is the unique Takemiya style; probably no other player would even dream of playing here. White’s reason for not answering 13 is that he is afraid that he will end in gote, which would let Black enclose the top left corner with 17. If White makes an ordinary approach move there, a pincer will work well for Black. That being the case, one would normally consider making a white pincer at ‘a’, but presumably Takemiya disliked the prospect of Black’s answering at 17.

Black 15. Black sets out to secure the corner. He could also answer at 17 or 1 in Dia. 1; if the latter, White might force with 2 and 4, then play 6, but this is just a guess, as there are no analogous josekis.

White 20 is another move only Takemiya would play. It is slack territorially, compared to the diagonal connection at ‘b’, but if Black plays ‘c’ Takemiya would presumably be delighted to extend at ‘d’. On the other hand, White 20 makes superior shape if White later gets to descend at ‘c’. Moves like 14 and 20 show how creative Takemiya is in the fuseki.

Black 21 and 23 are good moves. If Black played 21 at 28, White ‘e’ would be just right. White 24 is the proper move (honte).

White 26 to 30 eliminate the threat of Black ‘f’ but at the cost of strengthening Black.

Black 32. A good point.

Black 33. Since Black has become strong in the centre, he decides to attack White, but this group is not really vulnerable; 33 is perhaps a bit of an overplay. Rin suggested playing 1 in Dia. 2. If White 2 and 4, Black enters the corner and looks forward to playing ‘a’. The series of jumps to 38 seems to make Black a little heavier than White. In view of that, it might have been a good idea for Black to settle his group immediately with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. This way his group would not become a burden to him.
DIET. 4

Figure 2 (41 - 74).
AHEAD IN TERRITORY, BUT...

Black 41 is the only move. If at 44, White’s double peep at ‘a’ becomes a threat. White 42 and 44 are also natural: defending with White ‘b’—Black ‘c’—White ‘d’ is unappealing as the 3-3 point is left open.

Black 49. The professional touch. Taking sente with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4 in order to switch to 5 might look more efficient, but this gives White too good a shape.

White 50 at 1 in Dia. 5 would be too greedy. Black makes the white stones here heavy and stops White from getting territory at the bottom. In any case, White is satisfied with 52, because he finally achieves territorial balance with Black.

Black 53 is the biggest move. Black accepts that after he lives White will attack his centre group. However, before invading he should exchange Black 69 for White 73. Once White has played 68, he answers 69 by attacking at 70.

Black 73 puts Black ahead in territory again, but if anything Black has the more disagreeable position, as his two group are being subjected to a double attack (karami).

DIAGRAM 4

Figure 2 (41 - 74).

DIAGRAM 5

Figure 3 (75 - 100).

HONINBO PRIZE MONEY

1st prize: ¥17,000,000 (about $110,000)
2nd prize: ¥3,400,000.

Match fee — title-holder: ¥5,700,000
challenger: ¥3,800,000

Game fees in the league: ¥600,000 for winner,
¥450,000 for loser. At the other end, the game fee for a shodan in the 1st prelim. round is ¥47,000 (about $305).

A list of title winners is given in GW33, page 8.
For a ‘mini-encyclopedia’, see GW42, page 27.

Figure 3 (75 - 100). CENTRE AJI

White 76—Black 77. It’s hard to evaluate the merits of this exchange. White mitigates the threat of Black ‘a’ (refer to Dia. 6), but on the other hand he helps Black out by giving him the capturing sequence of 79 to 85.

White 88. Attacking with 1 in Dia. 6 might seem more fast-paced, but Black would just reply by capturing with 2 and 4, giving him good aji.
in the centre. White would now lose if he couldn’t capture the other black group. However, Black has the aji of a ko with Black ‘a’ through ‘g’, so expecting to capture Black is not realistic.

White 96. Over-aggressive: White should defend at 1 in Dia. 7, letting Black live with 2 to 6, then parachute into the corner at 7. Black cannot escape unscathed. In the sequence to 17, which is just one possibility, White gets a ko.

**Figure 4 (101 – 123). A missed opportunity**

Black rides roughshod over White’s bottom area with 1 and 3, then harasses the white group with 7. White has to scramble to get two eyes—a painful turnabout when he thought that he was the one attacking (with 96 in Figure 3). The outside black group is too big to die, so the game has now turned in Black’s favour.

White 12. If omitted, Black ‘a’ threatens a ko while defending the cutting point at 13.

Black 19 is a good forcing move, but while he’s about it Black should reinforce the top left corner by continuing with Black ‘b’, White ‘c’, Black ‘d’.

Black 21 and 23 secure the large group. If White blocks at 1 in Dia. 8 with 24, Black uses the peep at 2 to launch a counterattack. Actually, however, Black had an even better move for 23.

**Dia. 9.** Black simply blocks at 1. If 2, he cuts with 3 and 5. The question is whether White
is alive after 6 to 10. The answer is not unconditionally, as Black 11 is sente against the group to the left. If White answers 13 at 14, a ko follows; dodging to 19 with 14 does not work, as Black attaches at 15. A ko here would be no less than a disaster for White, so he would have to give way with 2 in Dia. 10, letting Black extricate himself with excellent aji up to 9.

For the time being, Black 21 and 23 take care of the group, but the course of the subsequent fighting might make White 'e' feasible, so the black group is not completely out of danger.

Figure 4 (124 – 160). The lead changes hands.

White 24. White is aiming at 'a'. Ordinarily 24 and 36 should be miai points (if White takes one, Black takes the other), but Black's weakness in the centre means that he has to forfeit his 'right' to play at 36. If he had followed Dia. 10, the points would of course have remained as miai.

Black 25. What would happen if Black jumped to 36? White would promptly play 30 and 32, sending an electric shock running through Black. When he tries to make life for his corner group, White automatically gets various forcing moves on the outside, so the threat of White 'a' becomes ominously real.

Black 29 has become necessary, but the forcing moves of 25 and 27 preceding it are dubious: they destroy aji and should be omitted.

Black 33. Black can't tenuki, of course: White kills the group as in Dia. 11.

White takes the lead again when he plays 36. Black 37 and 39 are an aggressive attempt to catch up. White can't resist. If he plays 40 at 1 in Dia. 12, Black counters with 2 to 6. Black therefore succeeds in taking a large profit up to 43 but in gote. Unfortunately for him, White is able to retain his lead by switching to 44.

Black 47, 49. Black has no choice but to live small in the corner. If he plays 47 at 1 in Dia. 13, he has trouble living after White 2. Of course, there is no problem if White blocks at 4, but he won't be so generous. Making a placement at 1 in Dia. 14 instead reduces Black to one eye.

Black 63. If omitted, White gets the ko in Dia. 15.

White 64, 66. White has now almost caught up on the board.

White 72. White means to play safe but actually gives himself bad aji. He should just block at 1 in Dia. 16. Black 2 seems to put him on the spot, as it makes miai of playing through at 'a' and the atari at 6, but White can cope by playing 3. Black may be able to cut with 4 and 6, but the white group is safe. White 7 is sente, so White is guaranteed an eye at 'b'; 9 and 11 secure a second one. That means that Black would have no choice but to connect at 'c' with 4; White then plays 'a', leaving Black with a cut at 'd', but White can absorb that much damage. Takemiya probably overlooked 3 because it is such a strange-looking move.

Black 81 is an attempt to upset White's lead. Giving way with 82 at 84 might lead to defeat and in any case is too timid a move for any self-respecting player, so White naturally intercepts at 82. However, Black 83 to 87 precipitate a crisis.

White 88 is a terrible move: Yamashiro should have been able to score an upset because of it.

White must instead play the hane at 1 in Dia. 17, which is the vital point of the semeai (capturing race). If Black 2, White plays 3 and the result is a ko. White should be able to win it, thanks to his threats against the centre black group. Note also that White is left with the threat of 'a' at the top.

Black 89 is the losing move. If Black had taken advantage of White’s mistake by descending at 1 in Dia. 18, he would have won. White will be unable to atari because of lack of liberties: that is why 1 is the vital point. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 18. White 2 and 4 are the strongest moves, but even so White only succeeds in catching the five-stone tail of Black’s group. Black lives in the corner with 7, so this is bad for White.

Dia. 19. If Black can get an eye on the edge here, he has a second eye at 'a' or 'b' (after White 'c', Black 'd').
No luck on Black’s side

Black seems to have got his eye with 1, but White finally takes the vital point of 2 in the fight on the side.

Black 9. If at 11, Black still gets a ko. Black 9 aims at winning the semeai by setting up a double ko, but that is not how it works out.

Black 13. Black should first play at 23, forcing White to connect at ‘a’. Note that Black cannot win by filling in a liberty with 1 in Dia. 20. If White 2 and 4, he does get a double ko (at 4 and at 5), but instead of 2 White will fill in the liberties on the other side of the semeai with ‘a’, Black ‘b’, White ‘c’, Black ‘d’, setting up a large ko here. Black has no luck at all.

Black 37. Black runs out of ko threats first, but this move and 39 are not enough.

A win is a win

As the commentary makes clear, Takemiya needed his fair share of luck to pick up this win, but that doesn’t detract from its value. A seven-game series is like a marathon, so a loss in the first game is not decisive, but still it puts pressure on the opponent. The other side of the coin is that Yamashiro probably gained confidence from his performance in this game that he would be able to stop Takemiya from having it all his way. This was a very difficult game, involving complex problems of life and death. In his baptism into tournament play at the top, Yamashiro did not disgrace himself.

White wins by 4½ points.

Game Two

Takemiya’s career seemed to be approaching a new peak when this game was played. Everyone expected him to defend his title after the auspicious start he had made to the match, while the week before he won his sixth straight game in the Meijin league (against Ishida Akira), putting him two points clear of the field. He could have been forgiven if his already ample self-confidence had grown even greater.
The difference in stature between him and the challenger was only emphasized by the fact that Yamashiro, then 5-dan, had been the game recorder when he played the third game of the 32nd Honinbo title match (against Kato) nine years earlier at the same venue, the Gero hot springs resort. In fact, this is the first time that a player has challenged someone for whom he once acted as game recorder.

White: Yamashiro Hiroshi
Black: Takemiya Masaki
Played on 28, 29 May 1986 at Gero Spa, Gifu prefecture.

Figure 1 (1–50)
42: connects

Figure 1 (1–50)
Black 17 is Takemiya style. He doesn’t defend at ‘a’, as he is happy to see White play on the second line with 18.

Black 39. This ko leads to a trade (furikawari). The result to 52 in Figure 2 looks good for Black, but White is presumably satisfied with his four corners.

Figure 2 (51–100)
White 56 is Yamashiro’s attempt to negate Takemiya’s moyo strategy, but it has the ironical effect of helping Takemiya to build centre thickness with 57 to 67. The latter was probably happy with his game when he made the diagonal move at 69.

White 72. The sealed move. This is a very difficult point for White, as Black is on the verge of completing his moyo.

White 74 is an example of what is known as Yamashiro’s ‘osmotic’ style. Instead of a head-on challenge to the moyo, he just seeps in at the edge. Played now, White 74 works as a forcing move; if played after Black 79, Black would cut to the right of 74 instead of answering at 75. In that case, White would have to start a fight inside Black’s moyo, perhaps by invading at 83 to utilize the threat of White 75. White 74 takes four points in sente, though of course if White were to invade the moyo later, the exchange for 75 would be bad for him.

Black 79 is the turning point: invading the bottom left corner at ‘d’ would lead to a completely different kind of game. Invading would secure the lead for Black, but he prefers to win in proper Takemiya style by enclosing the centre.

Takemiya was confident that the sequence to 91 would give him the game, but Yamashiro’s 92 to 96 showed there was a discrepancy in the positional judgement of the two. If White were behind he would have staked everything on an invasion of the left side, but this sequence indicated that he was confident he had enough territory.

White 100. Again the Yamashiro style, nibbling at the edges of Black’s territory.
Black 5 is the losing move. Takemiya presumably played here because he could not find a suitable way of defending the left side with one move. Black 5 is big (12 points in reverse sente) and makes it easy to calculate the value of the centre moyo, but Black should have played at ‘a’ on the left side (‘a’ would be better aji than a move at 8). Apparently, however, Takemiya did not foresee the invasion at 6 — he expected White ‘a’, which would have been easier to deal with.

White 6 is a very clever move; if at ‘a’, Black attaches at 6, then hanes at 38 and is not seriously affected. White 10, reducing the territory from the top, is a perfect continuation. White gets an excellent follow-up in the form of the placement at 32. The play in this area wins the game for White.

Black 41 is a clever endgame move; the combination of 43 and 45 that follows aims both at the corner and at the aji of ‘b’ and ‘c’, but White answers cautiously up to 52 and escapes unscathed.

Yamashiro picks up his first, but unfortunately his only, win of the series. Watching are Tsuchida 9-dan (behind Yamashiro) and Hane 9-dan (beside the board). For the first time in a title game in 20 years (since Sakata and Shuko in the 1966 Honinbo title match) both players are wearing traditional Japanese dress.
This win was Yamashiro's answer to the go fans who had written off his chances before the series even started. He let Takemiya follow his favourite moyo strategy and was able to counter it without having to resort to a desperate invasion. He looked a lot more cheerful at the party after the game than he had after the first game.

White wins by 2½ points.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 34 minutes.
Black: 8 hours 22 minutes.

('Kido', July 1986. Translated by John Power.)

Games 3 to 5 will be given in Go World 46.

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In this series Rin Kaiho analyses the elements that make up good style and correct shape in a number of basic patterns. The theme of the series is how to use this knowledge to attack and defend correctly. The aim is not to give you sequences to memorize but to help you develop your feel for the game so that you will be able to find the correct move instinctively.

Problem 5. White to play

White 1 is a standard technique in handicap games. Instead of answering peacefully with 'a', Black has countered aggressively with 2 and 4. The question now is what is the best way for White to settle his group. If White does not know how to cope with Black's counterattack, he should not play a move like 1 to begin with.

Problem 6. Black to play

White 1 is a little impudent, as it is obviously inviting Black to cut at 'a'. Black may feel apprehensive about accepting the invitation, but provided he knows an important tesuji he can handle the ensuing fight. It is one that often comes up in actual play, so it is worth learning.

Answers on page 36.
Continued from page 35

**Answer to Problem 5**

Dia. 1 (standard). Black 2 is the most common answer. This lets White lay waste to his territory by continuing with ‘a’, but Black is able to go on the offensive, so the result is not disadvantageous for him. In contrast —

Dia. 1: standard

Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 2 to 6 attempt to keep the territory on the side, so this approach is a little negative.

Dia. 3 (awful). White should not expect to get too much in this fight. He could take the corner with 3 to 7, but giving Black the tortoise-shell capture of 4 and 6 is terrible. Black’s strength from this would dominate the board.

Dia. 3: terrible

Dia. 4: failure

Dia. 4 (not what White wants). White 1 aims at cutting next at ‘a’, but if Black keeps up the pressure with 2, it is likewise doomed to failure.

Dia. 5 (crude). The atari at 3 is crude. Even though White is able to make the hane at 5, his shape lacks resilience and he has no thickness to speak of.

Dia. 6 (satisfactory thickness). Simply extending at 3 is correct: this is the honte (proper move). White has ‘a’ next, so Black more or less has to play 4, but then White can make good thickness with 5. He is satisfied with the result to 6.

If the reader is not impressed with White’s result, then we have to say that his understanding of thickness has not yet matured.

Depending on the game, White might continue by attaching at ‘b’ or he might try to increase his centre thickness by pressing at ‘c’.

**Answer to Problem 6**

Dia. 1 (submission). Black naturally responds to the hane (the marked stone) by cutting at 1. If White then ataris at 2, Black’s cut succeeds in cutting off the marked stone from its allies. However, Black doesn’t expect to have it quite this easy.

Dia. 2 (more aggressive). The problem is how Black should fight when White counters the cut with 2 and 4.

Dia. 1: feeble

Dia. 2: White resists

Dia. 3: wrong

Dia. 4: wrong

Dia. 3 (bad style). Black 1 takes aim at White’s shortage of liberties, but this move is too blunt — it is bad style. When White resists with 2 etc., Black loses the semeai.

Dia. 4 (the descent). What about the descent
Dia. 5: seki
Dia. 6: the tesuji
to 1? If 2, Black makes shape with 3, but when White attaches at 4 —
Dia. 5 (seki). The best Black can do is to get a seki.
Dia. 6 (the kosumi tesuji). Black 1 is a tesuji which should be a part of every player's repertoire. It aims at the hane at 'a' and also works much better than the simple descent in the semeai with the three white stones. Next —

Dia. 7: Black wins
Dia. 8: Black wins
Dia. 7 (an easy win). If White 1, Black hanes at 2, and White cannot block at 4 as he has no answer to Black's cut at 'a'. He must drop back to 3, but then Black increases his liberties with 4, giving him an easy win in the semeai.
Dia. 8 (follow-up tesuji). If White descends at 1, Black strikes at 2 and it's all over. ('Kido', March 1986)

The World's Top Ten

In its September issue, 'Igo Club' asked Ishida Akira 9-dan and Takagi Shoichi 9-dan to give their rankings of the world's top ten players as the final instalment of a discussion series these two players had been publishing in the magazine. Joining them as a guest was Kamimura Kunio 8-dan, who also gave his selection, while the moderator was Konishi Taizo 6-dan. Below are their selections and some extracts from their discussion.

Takagi Shoichi
1. Kobayashi Koichi
2. Cho Chikun
3. Takemiya Masaki
4. Otake Hideo
5. Kato Masao
6. Cho Hun-hyun
7. Rin Kaiho
8. Nie Weiping
9. Yamashiro Hiroshi
10. Ma Xiaochun

Ishida Akira
1. Kobayashi Koichi
2. Cho Chikun
3. Takemiya Masaki
4. Otake Hideo
5. Kato Masao
6. Rin Kaiho
6. Cho Hun-hyun
6. Yamashiro Hiroshi
9. Ma Xiaochun
9. Nie Weiping
9. Hane Yasumasa
9. Sonoda Yuichi

Kamimura Kunio
1. Cho Chikun
2. Kobayashi Koichi
3. Takemiya Masaki
4. Otake Hideo
5. Otake Hideo
6. Rin Kaiho
7. Ishida Akira
8. Cho Hun-hyun
9. Ma Xiaochun
10. Miyazawa Goro

A couple of the above selections may come as a bit of a surprise to the reader. Here are some of the panel's comments.

Takagi: There's no doubt about the top two. I think that their strength is almost equal, so the ranking simply reflects their current earnings.
Kamimura: I also thought that putting Kobayashi on top would be more usual, but I feel there are differences in the way they grapple with the game, their methods of study, you could say, or their approach. Because of my own preferences, I put Cho on top.
Konishi: What do you mean, concretely?
Kamimura: To oversimplify, Koichi studies in order to win, Cho in order to refine his art — that's the basic difference I feel in the way they approach go. If you ask which approach is more arduous, though, Koichi may have much the
tougher time of it. He's cast off the pleasurable side of the game.

Ishida: Because he doesn’t try to take refuge in the game.

Konishi: ... By coincidence, everyone has Takemiya third.

Takagi: That's only natural: he's lost to the other two in the Kisei and the Judan.

Ishida: Recently Takemiya has started showing signs of a hunger to win. Will this be a plus factor for his go? Or will it distort the innate majesty of his game?

Kamimura: If this hunger and the Takemiya style work in unison to perfect his game, nothing could be better, of course.

Takagi: Putting Otake fourth may seem too high in view of his recent results, but the impact you feel from actually playing him gives you no choice.

Ishida: Personally, I'd prefer to make him number one. As far as mastery of the game is concerned, he ranks above the other three. But his recent results ... He has too much income apart from tournaments, he's kept too busy; he's got too much on his mind and may have lost his hunger to win. What a pity, with his great talent — it's a loss for the go world.

Takagi: Akira is quite strong, but he hardly wins anything outside the Meijin league. There are some problems in his mental attitude.

Ishida: There aren’t many players stronger than me, but looking at it objectively I shouldn’t make the list.

Konishi: Cho Hun-hyun is highly regarded.

Takagi: Looking at his game records, you realize that he's strong, that he's no ordinary player. In his games against Nie and Rin, his play was superior. [See GW41 for the Nie games and Ranka Nos. 1 and 2 for the Rin games.]

Kamimura: I've only played Cho Hun-hyun before he went back to Korea [he studied in Japan from 1963 to 1972], but he was overflowing with talent. A born go player.

Takagi: Who would match him in go talent — Otake and Takemiya?

Ishida: That's impertinent to Otake. They're in a different class. Hun-hyun was lucky he had to go home to serve his conscription. He was disciplined physically and spiritually; it made a real player of him. If he had just stayed in Japan, I doubt that he would be the player he is today. ... 

Takagi: There are differences of opinion about Nie. To be honest, his go has its awkward side, but his forcefulness in the middle game is really something. After his accomplishment last year in levelling Kobayashi Koichi, Kato, and Shuko, you can hardly leave him out of the list. I feel that Ma Xiaochan has talent. Based on his
achievements to date, some people would put him higher in the list, but I expect him to go on to even greater things on the world stage.

Kamimura: I haven’t actually played him. There’s no doubt that he’s quite a player, but I can’t really tell just from game records. Maybe that shows how weak I am. At present, wouldn’t you have to rank Nie and Ma equal?

Konishi: Ishida, you’ve played both of them. [For Ishida v. Ma, see GW42, p. 14.]

Ishida: Their strength from the middle game on is impressive. Putting them in the top ten is natural. After all, they both beat me. I can’t say anything against them.

Konishi: Including Rin, that makes three Chinese in the top ten and two Koreans. The day of a world championship must be drawing near.

Kamimura: I really wanted to include Miyazawa Goro in the list. In one sense, you can say that he has the most remarkable talent. When he was a child, Takemiya’s talent was apparent to all, but I didn’t think it was as great as Goro’s. Until I met him, I had had a certain amount of self-esteem, but it just evaporated.

Takagi: And the shock made you give up striving to be number one? Goro’s go is quite something—it’s violent and individualistic. . . .

Konishi: It’s a little late to bring this up, but what are the criteria for evaluating strength?

Kamimura: Technique, of course. What else but technique demonstrated on the go board?

Takagi: Technique is the minimum condition; there’s also the factor of whether or not one is able to display one’s technique adequately.

Ishida: The spirit-technique-body they speak of in sumo.

Konishi: The dozen or so players listed here also lose quite a lot. They’re a long way from possessing absolute strength. . . . According to Fukui Masaaki 8-dan, the conditions for go strength are simple. The first is technique. If technique is equal, then physical condition, stamina. If they are also equal, then the player with black will win. Apparently, this was first said by Honinbo Dochi a long time ago.

Takagi: Someone like Dochi, with his secure spiritual strength, may always be able to display all his potential, but that doesn’t apply to us ordinary mortals.

Konishi: There’s also Sakai Takeshi’s theory. According to him, technical skill is of course an absolute, but the key is the extent to which you can release your energy when you face the go board. This is what is meant by concentration; he says your concentration can elevate your technique. And your concentration depends on your passion for go, the affection you have for it, on whether you can pour your life into it.

Takagi: That’s the unique world of Sakai. At least there is no connection between go strength and personality.

Ishida: Sakai is my friend. Why is he left out when all these Chinese players are getting in? I guess I’m babbling.

Kamimura: Sakai has overwhelming results against Chinese players. He beat them on energy, did he?

(‘Igo Club’, September 1986. Translated by John Power.)
Three Trick Moves
Abe Yoshiteru 9-dan

1. Black to play
White 2 is a violent move, so Black has to be careful how he answers it. He must not be timid but counterattack.

2. Black to play
White 4 is a very old trick play. What does White want and how does Black avoid giving it to him?

3. White to play
Black 3 is a valid move and is a joseki. How should White respond?

Answers on page 42

Tesuji Magic
Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan

The tesuji problems below require a leap of the imagination to solve, but they should be within the reach of kyu-level players who are prepared to put their minds to solving them. If the obvious move doesn't work, try changing the timing.

1. Black to play
Black has to overcome the problem of his own shortage of liberties while exploiting the same problem in White's position.

2. White to play
If White doesn't attack skilfully, his own stones will be captured. A little bit of creativity is called for here.

3. White to play
The one captured black stone causes White a lot of problems by reducing his liberties. It may take some thinking to find the vital point.
4. Black to play

With a touch of magic, you can rescue the three black stones seemingly surrounded by White.

5. White to play

Black has just made the contact play on the first line. It’s easy for White to go wrong in answering: his first move will be decisive.

Answers on page 43

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Ishida Yoshio

We are all only too well aware of the disastrous mistakes that lose us games, but to the professional eye the typical amateur game is more notable for small mistakes in style and in tactical thinking. The accumulation of small losses throughout a game may be just as costly as a big mistake.

Mistake 6

Black 6 and 8 are bad moves that weak kyu players seem to make without fail in this joseki. How much does this combination cost Black and what should he play?

In this series, Ishida Yoshio runs some typical amateur mistakes through his computer and comes up with numerical values for them. When you know how much a habitual mistake is costing you, it may be easier to avoid making it.

Mistake 7

Black 7 is another mistake in joseki. The diagonal connection (kaketsugi) is often effective, but not here.

Mistake 8

Black 2 is a mistake in direction. Because it’s solid, it’s not a really bad move, but still it loses points. How many?

Answers on page 46
Three Trick Moves: Answers

Answer to Problem 1
Dia. 1. Black 1 and White 2 are natural. The problems begin with Black 3: this leads Black into a trap. After 4 —
Dia. 2. Black captures a stone with 5 and 7, but White plays forcing moves on top and on the edge. This result is bad for Black. Note that Black 11 at 'a' would be bad because of White 11.
Dia. 3: correct
Dia. 4: good
Dia. 5: profit
Dia. 1: wrong
Dia. 2: tricked
Dia. 3: correct
Dia. 4: good
Dia. 5: satisfactory
Dia. 2: a lost game
Dia. 3: correct
Dia. 4: satisfactory
Dia. 5: satisfactory

Dia. 2. Squeezes in sente up to 28. Black gets a mere 18 points in the corner, so this is a great success for White. His outside thickness dominates the whole board.
Dia. 3. Black has to exercise some self-restraint; instead of trying to capture White, he should defend at 5. Next —
Dia. 4. White has to defend at 1: once he loses the cut, he can't squeeze, so he can't give up the corner. Black then goes on the offensive with 2 and can be happy with his game.
Dia. 5. If White makes the hane at 2 first, the same principle applies: Black must defend his cutting point instead of trying to take the corner. In this case, Black 3 makes good shape, and with 5 Black gets a similar result to Dia. 4.

Answer to Problem 3
Dia. 1. White 1, trying to break through the gap that Black purposely created in his position, is just what Black wants. He uses his sente moves at 2 and 4 to make good shape and to turn White 1 into a bad move.
Dia. 2. If White counters with 3 and 5, he gets into bad trouble. Black 6 is sente (confirm

Dia. 5: profit
Dia. 1: wrong

Dia. 1: good for Black
Dia. 2: disaster for White
for yourself that White can't block to the left of 6 with 7), so White collapses after Black 8.

Dia. 3. Attaching at 1 is the correct move. It may seem to be slack, considering how weak the black stones appear, but it is the vital point. In response, Black 2 is the vital point for settling the black group.

Dia. 5: bad for Black

Dia. 4. The joseki is for each side to capture a stone. However, both White 3 and Black 4 could be kept in reserve.

Dia. 5. Black 2 is a mistake. After 3 and 5, the marked black stone is slack — for full efficacy, it should be at 'a'.

('Let's Go', September 1984)

Tesuji Magic: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is so slow-moving that it can hardly be called an attack on White. The latter lives easily with 2 and 4.

Dia. 2. The placement at 1 is a less half-hearted attack, but it only gives White the same result with a different order of moves. It should be apparent that White lives if he can occupy the point of 2, so —

Dia. 1: hopeless

Dia. 2: alive

Dia. 3: the tesuji

Dia. 4: the vital point

Dia. 3. What if Black plays there himself? It may not look like much of a threat, but it is soon seen to be the vital point for attack.

Dia. 4. If White intercepts at 2, Black exploits his shortage of liberties with the hane at 3. Discovering this tesuji is the key to solving the problem.

Dia. 5. White 1 is unavailing: Black captures him with 2.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. If White 1 and Black 2, White captures with 3 and 5, but Black has a better answer than this. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 6: failure

Dia. 7: dead

Dia. 6. If Black carelessly answers 1 by turning at 2, White can live with 3. Black 2 at 4 also fails when White connects at 5. Black can't let White occupy the vital point of 3.

Dia. 7. If White answers at 2, Black plays 3 and 5, preventing White from playing atari. White dies.

Dia. 1: wrong for Black
Dia. 2: Black's tesuji
Dia. 3: Black wins
Dia. 2. Black will counter with the tesuji of 2. White has no answer. For example —
Dia. 3. If White 1, Black captures three stones. Instead of 1 —
Dia. 4. If White 1, Black still wins with 2 and 4.
Dia. 5. White tries connecting at 1 to repair the defect in his shape, but Black squeezes up to 6, then —
Dia. 4: Black wins
Dia. 5: squeeze
Dia. 6: Black escapes
Dia. 7: Black wins
Dia. 6. When White connects at 1, Black connects at 2, and White cannot cut at 4. That means that Black escapes. Instead of 3 —
Dia. 7. If White cuts at 1, Black gets a ladder.
Dia. 8. The diagonal move of 1 is the tesuji. Note that this is the same point as the vital point for Black in Dia. 2. If Black 2, White can now cut at 3, thus capturing Black.
Dia. 8: the tesuji
Dia. 9: success
Dia. 10: also correct
Dia. 9. If Black connects at 2, White cuts at 3 and has no trouble capturing Black.
Dia. 10. Actually this problem has two correct answers, as the connection at 1 also serves to capture Black. The diagonal connection at 'a' is perhaps a little more stylish.

Dia. 1: failure
Dia. 1
Dia. 2
Dia. 2. White hastens to capture Black with 1, but this also fills in one of his own liberties. After 4, White is shocked to find that he cannot atari.
Dia. 2. Playing on the other side at 1 works no better. After 2, Black wins the fight. As in Dia. 1, the captured black stone proves to be a thorn in White's side.
Dia. 2: also wrong
Dia. 3: Black wins
Dia. 3. White 1 looks vaguely like a tesuji, but Black easily counters it with 2 and 4, again winning the fight.
Dia. 4. On the other hand, White 1 fails
Dia. 5: the tesuji
Dia. 6: success
Dia. 7: White wins

because it gives Black time to capture the stones on the other side.

Dia. 5. The leisurely move of 1 is the correct answer: it succeeds in preventing Black from putting the white stones in atari. If Black descends at 2, White kosumis from the other side and wins the fight. This double kosumi tesuji is just a little unusual.

Dia. 6. If Black 1, White wins the semeai by one move.

Dia. 7. Answering 1 at 2 does not save Black if White answers correctly.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Pushing through at 1 leads nowhere, of course.

Dia. 2. Black 3 looks like a vital point, but if Black precedes it with the 1–2 exchange he fails to achieve anything.

Dia. 3: the vital point
Dia. 4: success
Dia. 5. Answering underneath at 2 doesn't help White. Black 3 is again sente, so Black escapes with 5. White can't cut to the right of 5 as he will be captured. If White 'a' next, Black kills him with the hane at 'b'. This result is even more than Black hoped for.

Dia. 5: White dies
Dia. 6: White resists
Dia. 7: in vain

Dia. 6. Connecting at 2 is the toughest counter. White aims to fight a semeai with 4 and 6, but Black need not panic. After 6 —

Dia. 7. The throw-in at 5 puts Black one move ahead in the capturing race.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. If White 'a' at 1, Black can set up a ko with 4. If White 1 at 6, Black
Dia. 1: dead
Dia. 2: dead
Dia. 3: dead
Dia. 4: the only move

Dia. 2. If White 1, Black easily kills him with 2 and 4.
Dia. 3. White 1 is just as futile: Black kills him with 2 and 4.
Dia. 4. Surprisingly, turning at 1 is the most effective defence. If Black 2, White 3 makes miai of a second eye in the centre and on the side with 5.
Dia. 5. The 2—3 exchange does not worry White, as he can capture 2 to make his second eye. White 1 is a hard move to find, but it is the only way to live.

('Let's Go', September 1984)

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Answers

Pattern 6: Black 1 and 3 lose about 5 points.

I am sure that most of my readers will readily accept that 1 and 3 are bad moves. With 1, Black is committing a glaring solecism by running head-on into a white stone. The proverb says to hane at the head of two stones, and in effect that is what Black is helping White to do. This is, however, a common mistake among low-ranked kyu players.

I assess the damage to Black's game as about five points. After 3 —
Dia. 1. White 1 becomes a good move. White is aiming at the cutting point at 'a', so Black can't resist. He must give way with 4 and 6. White will then capture with 7, so Black can defend at 8. This is the best continuation for Black after his mistake.

You might think that Black's position is not so terrible. After all, Black 4 and 6 make it difficult for White to escape with his solitary stone on the right side. Black's worries about the cutting point at 'a' have also been eliminated. Well, that's why I assess the damage at only five points. Black's mistake is not bad enough to ruin his whole game.

Dia. 2. The sequence here is the basis for my assessment. When Black has reinforced the corner
with the marked stone, invading at 1 is a joseki. Black 4 could also be at 6, but 4 is not a bad move. In reply to 5, connecting solidly at 6 is the proper move (honte). After 7, Black sets about making up for his loss in the corner by attacking with the pincer at 8.

Some joseki books give Black 8 at 'a', but this move is rubbish. Letting White extend to 'b' is slack. I recommend the attack at 8 for self-respecting players.

When you compare the two sequences, it's true that Black exerts slightly more pressure against the white stone in Dia. 1. However, this is more than outweighed by Black's terrible result at the top — outweighed to the extent of five points, in my opinion.

Dia. 3. If White tries to escape, Black chases him with 2, then attaches at 4. This fight will allow him to make full use of his thickness; an unfavourable result is inconceivable.

Dia. 4. If Black has second thoughts about the wisdom of what he is doing after playing 1, he can reduce the damage by backtracking and making shape with 3. Black 'a' will be a forceful move, and even if White extends to 4, Black 'b' will still be quite a severe attack. Let's say that this cuts Black's loss down to three points.

**Pattern 7: Black loses 3 points.**

The diagonal connection of 1 is a common mistake with weak and middle-level kyu players. Recently I was startled to see a dan player make it. When I questioned him about it after the game, he maintained that Black 3 after White 2 made good shape.

This is an absurd hallucination. The player didn't stop to think that he had made his opponent an outright gift of the large hane at 2. Let's be conscientious and review the whole joseki.

Dia. 1. This is a variation of the attach-and-extend (tsukenobi) joseki. When White attaches at 4, Black hanes at 5, then connects tightly at 7. White 8 and Black 9 conclude the joseki. Black 7 at 'a' is a mistake. The reason —

Dia. 2.

Dia. 2. If White made the hane at 1, would anyone answer by giving way with 2? You'd be laughed out of the go club. But in effect this is what Black has done in Pattern 7. Black 2 here loses more than five points, but in Pattern 7 the marked black stone is at 'a'. The only
redeeming point is that Black ‘a’ does make reasonably good shape. Putting these two factors together, I get a loss of three points for Black.

To review the categories of bad moves given in the first instalment of this series (GW43):

2 or 3 points: a minor bad move. Some of these moves might be solid and might actually help to simplify the position in a game with a lot of handicap stones.

5 points: a moderately bad move. A number of such moves will lose the game.

10 points: a very bad move. Such moves will lose the game at one blow, so they are to be avoided at all costs.

Pattern 7 belongs to the first group. Such mistakes may not actually cause your game very much damage, but if you don’t eliminate them you can’t hope to improve.

**Pattern 8: Black 2 loses at most 2 points.**

Answering White 1 at 2 or ‘a’ is a mistake in direction. However, it is undeniably a solid move, so I make it, at most, a two-point loss. Erring in the direction of solidity is not the worst thing you can do in a game.

Dia. 1. The position arises from this joseki. White has played at ‘a’ to reduce the moyo.

Dia. 2. The problem for Black is that after the marked exchange White can play 1 and 3 in sente. Black will instinctively answer 3 at 4 or ‘a’. This is bad. It is important for Black to tenuki with 4. The way to look at it is that the marked black stone has linked up all the black stones. In short, you should abandon the idea of trying to surround territory with the marked stone. Instead of 4, Black should switch to a large point elsewhere; if White then cuts at 4, he should ignore him and take another large point. Black may lose about ten points at the top, but he will gain much more from playing two large points elsewhere.

Unfortunately, 99 people out of 100 will be convinced that once having played the marked stone they have to look after their territory at the top by playing 4. Then —

Dia. 3. If White attaches at 1, they will continue to play submissively by answering with 2 to 8. In this result Black gets close to 20 points of territory, but White matches that with his top right corner alone. When you consider the disadvantage at which Black will have to fight when White plays ‘a’, it’s apparent that the course of play in Dias. 2 and 3 has lost Black more than five points. Once Black goes wrong initially with 2 in Pattern 8, he should at least avoid compounding the damage with 4 in Dia. 2.

Dia. 4: correct direction

Dia. 4. Black 2 is the correct answer to White 1. Since White can make the hane at ‘a’, Black
does not get enough territory to make it worth while surrounding the area on the top right. How much preferable then to develop the virgin territory on the top left! The strategic grasp of the game shown by a move like 2 is worthy of a dan player.

Black has nothing to fear when he plays 2. For example —

Dia. 5. If White impudently attacks at 1, Black hanes at 2, then pulls back at 4. White can do nothing. Instead of 2, Black could also attack more strongly with Black 3, White 2, Black 'a'; White would be in bad trouble.

Dia. 6. White will probably just jump sideways to 2. Black would answer at 3, inviting White to save the marked stone if he wants to. The point is that Black can then place the whole white group under attack. In the process he gets to defend the top with 9. The territory you get in the course of an attack is bigger than territory you take by simply surrounding. Just as important is the fact that White is too busy escaping to make any territory himself. The sequence here is an ideal development for Black.

Dia. 7. The position here is a little different. So far from losing points, capturing the marked white stone with Black 2 or ‘a’ is a very good move. It would score full points. In this case, the marked black stones are quite thin and vulnerable to attack. Black is therefore very happy to make the 1—2 exchange.

If White later attaches at ‘b’, Black can be satisfied with pulling back at ‘c’. Likewise, he can docilely answer White ‘d’.

The fact that the same move is bad in Pattern 8 and good in Dia. 7 shows how difficult go is. Not that it’s a very bad move in Pattern 7 — it’s just not recommended for players who want to improve. It’s also important to understand the thinking behind the tenuki we recommended in Dia. 2.

(‘Let’s Go’, March 1985)

The Go Burglar
by William Pinckard

During the Edo period a go club, like a tea-ceremony room or a kyoka poetry meeting, was a place where rank, station and sex were irrelevant: what mattered most was the skill of the participants. Such people came as close to forming a genuine meritocracy as was possible in class-conscious Japan in those days, and this must have been a large part of go’s appeal to new players.

The fact that go requires deep concentration over relatively long periods of time naturally leads to absent-mindedness in everything unrelated to the game at hand. The absent-minded go player is a stock joke in Japan like the absent-minded professor in the West. A fine example of this is the old story called Go Doro, ‘the Go Burglar,’ several versions of which are preserved in the public story-telling tradition of the Edo and Meiji periods.

Two friends who were addicted to go and were pretty evenly matched used to play every night until very late, so wrapped up in their games...
that they were oblivious to everything around them. This was a great nuisance to their families, but the worst part of it was their habit of smoking, for they were always spilling hot ash and making holes in the tatami as they lit their pipes from the burning coal in the tobacco tray.

Their wives kept scolding them about this until finally they had to quit playing altogether. But they couldn’t keep from thinking about go and wishing they could play again. One evening they hit upon a plan.

‘Let’s just stop smoking while we play! Instead, we’ll go out and have a pipe after each game!’

It’s a splendid idea, but of course they forget all about it as soon as they get into their first game and start fiddling with their pipes. After a while one of them notices something.

‘Oy!’ he calls out. ‘There’s no coal in the tobacco tray!’

The wife thinks to herself: ‘If I put a coal in the tray they’ll start burning holes in the tatami all over again. I’ll find something red and bring that instead.’

So from the kitchen she brings in a small red vegetable called a snake-gourd and carefully pokes it down into the ashes of the tobacco tray, where it looks just like a bit of burning coal. The men don’t notice a thing, and after a while the wife goes to bed, satisfied that she has nothing more to worry about.

On and on the two friends play, frowning and muttering at the go board, sucking away at their pipes, and having a great old time.

Later that night a burglar sneaks into the back of the house. He stealthily fills his bag with everything he can get his hands on and hoists it over his shoulder. Just as he is about to take off he hears the click of a go stone.

The burglar plays go too, so when that sound comes to his ears his curiosity is aroused. With the bag still slung over his shoulder he tiptoes toward the room where the two friends are playing and peeks through the door.

At first he just stands there, watching, but then moves closer, bit by bit, until he’s right beside them. One player is about to make a move. The burglar simply can’t control himself.

‘That’s no good!’ he exclaims, putting down the bag. ‘You ought to play on the other side!’ A typical kibitzer’s remark.

Both men are studying the board. ‘Hey, onlookers are supposed to keep quiet,’ says one. ‘This happens to be a crucial moment in the game.’ He glances up briefly. ‘Who might you be, anyway?’ he asks. Click goes a stone onto the board.

All three study the move. It’s a tense moment.

‘I’m a burglar,’ comes the reply.

‘Hmm . . .’ (Click goes another stone.) ‘I see . . .’ (Click.) ‘Well, make yourself at home . . .’

(Adapted from ‘Japanese Prints and the World of Go,’ to be published in January 1987.)
The Great Joseki Debate
Honda Kunihisa 9-dan

How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. White has just attached with the triangled stone at the top, and three proposals are being made for Black's next move. Which one do you think fits the fuseki best?

Dia. A

A: My first instinct is to hane at 1. Against an attachment like this, Black can't go wrong with a hane on this side. In fact, it's even better than that: it puts White in a fix.

Dia. B

B: If you consider Black's strength at the top, White's attachment is really a saucy move. I want to hane too, but on the other side. It's the strongest move and it counterattacks.

Dia. C

C: A little detached analysis is what is required here. White is just testing Black's response before trying to make sabaki. The extension at 1 thwarts him by making it difficult for him to settle his stones.

Fuseki Analysis

Since josekis work effectively in a certain direction, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides and in the adjacent corners when choosing a joseki for a particular opening. Positions in the opposite corner are usually only a factor when a ladder is involved. In this issue's fuseki (fuseki diagram, next page), the positions at the top and in the lower right corner will determine the choice of joseki.
At the top Black has thickness, against which White has attached with the marked stone. White cares little if Black solidifies the top, since Black is already strong there. If all goes well, he might even be able to force Black into an over-concentrated shape while he is settling his own stones. Falling in with White’s sabaki strategy is uninteresting for Black, so he must devise some means of using his thickness to set White up for an attack.

In the lower right corner, White has a stone on the three-four point and Black a stone on the five-three point. Black has the stronger position toward the outside because he can press at any time at ‘a’ or ‘b’. To take advantage of this superiority, he will want to develop along the right side.

Black must therefore choose a joseki that (1) does not give White any help in settling his stones at the top and (2) develops along the right side.

**C Wins the Debate**

Extending at 1 in Dia. 1 is the correct move. It is the one move that makes it difficult for White to get sabaki. Neither of the other moves gives Black a good result.

When White jumps to 2 (the usual move), Black builds up the right side while attacking at 3. After the continuation to 7, Black’s position at the top may seem unbearably low, but later he can look forward to attacking White while continuing to develop the right side.

Since Black can play in at ‘a’ in Dia. 2 after 7, White defends with 8. Black then adds a stone at 9 to protect against White 9 or ‘b’, which would be severe.

Black 9 on the fourth line strikes a good balance with the position in the lower right while keeping up the pressure on White. Because White’s group is still not completely settled, the game has become easy for Black.

Instead of 8 in Dia. 2, White could consider defending his weakness with 1 in Dia. 3, but being forced to answer Black ‘a’ at ‘d’ is painful, whereas answering at ‘b’ only leaves the aji of ‘c’. Because ‘a’ is sente for Black, he can extend to 2, once again getting an easy game.
Because defending directly simplifies the game for Black, White might try counterattacking from the side at 1 in Dia. 4 to create complications. Black plays the forcing moves at 2 and 4 and keeps White's stones separated by moving into the center with 6. Since Black has no weak groups, however, this strategy is unreasonable for White.

What if White goes back to the beginning, replacing the one-space jump in Dia. 1 with the pressing move in Dia. 5? He can certainly get a position without defects with the moves to 10, but he cannot stop Black from taking the lead with 11. (Omitting 11 would be a serious mistake for Black as it lets White play 'a'.)

Answering 1 with 2 in Dia. 6 is unreasonable.

After Black hanes at 3, White's only move is cutting at 4. After forcing with 6 and 8, White can live with the sequence to 16, but his four stones on the outside have only become a target for attack. Black can attack immediately at any of the points marked 'a' or he can simply stake out a position at 'b'. Either way, White seems to have a lost game.

If White switches 10 to 1 in Dia. 7, he will be all right if Black answers at 2. Black, however, will atari on the other side at 2 in
Dia. 8 and capture two stones with Black 4. This result is hopeless for White.

No matter what White tries, the best he can do is Dia. 2. This means the fuseki is a success for Black.

Attaching with the marked stone in Dia. 9 is a move with a special purpose. Black’s replies are at ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’. Black ‘a’ is the most common, but in this issue’s fuseki Black ‘c’ is the correct move.

Dia. 9 Dia. 10

The continuation to 3 in Dia. 10 is the same as if Black had played the pincer at 1 in Dia. 11. In this joseki pattern, Black forces once with 5 in Dia. 12 before crawling at 7. After pushing up at 9, he must crawl again at 11 in Dia. 13 before jumping out to 13. If he jumps to ‘a’ with 11, he gets a bad result when White pushes through. The pattern to 13 is a basic pattern of long standing.

Note that in the pattern in Dia. 2 (Dia. 14) Black has played a knight’s move (triangled stone) instead of crawling as in Dia. 13 and omitted the move at ‘a’. The knight’s move provides better balance with the two circled black stones. It also eliminates White’s forcing move at ‘a’ in Dia. 15 if Black were to play 1 and 3. Black plays this way to take away moves that would only strengthen White, blunting the attack he wants to make.

Dia. 11 Dia. 12

Dia. 15

When White extends at 1 in Dia. 16, Black would love to exchange 2 for 3, but the exchange would only invite disaster. Instead of descending at 3, White exchanges 1 and 3 in Dia. 17 for 2 and 4 and blocks at 5, getting an excellent result. If White plays the same

Dia. 16 Dia. 17

Dia. 13

Dia. 18

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moves in the one-space pincer joseki (3 and 5 in Dia. 18), he captures only one stone when he blocks at 7. Even though the marked stone is captured, it still retains a little aji, so Black is satisfied.

**A’s Proposal**

A’s idea was the hane at 1 in Dia. 19, against which White blocks at 2. Black then connects at 3 and, in the local context, has gained.

When White pincers at 1 in Dia. 20, White 3 is just right if Black answers with the kosumi at 2. In the sequence to 7 in Dia. 21, Black has been shut in, so this result is uninteresting for him.

Instead of playing the kosumi, Black must move out faster, with 2 in Dia. 22. Since pushing up at ‘a’ is a little unreasonable for White, he usually attaches at ‘b’.

If White does push up at 1 in Dia. 23, Black extends at 2. If White continues at 3, Black attaches at 4, then blocks solidly at 6. Because White has two groups to look after, the exchange favors Black.

If White switches 3 to 3 in Dia. 24, Black makes shape with 4. After 5 and 7, he takes the key point in the corner with 8, then turns at 10 when White jumps to 9. White is again split in two, so Black is satisfied.

When White attaches at 1 in Dia. 25 (‘b’ in Dia. 22), Black blocks at 2. If he hanes at 1 in Dia. 26 instead, White will be able to handle the fight, since Black cannot settle his stones in the sequence to 6. (If Black ataris at ‘a’, White fights a ko with ‘b’.)

After Black 2 in Dia. 25, White plays 3 in Dia. 27. Black’s response at 4 is flexible, and his follow-up at 6 in Dia. 28 is a tesuji. If White captures with 7, Black hanes at 8. Since he has ‘a’ left for later, Black can feel a bit smug about his cleverness.

White therefore connects at 7 in Dia. 29 instead of taking, and Black pincers at 8. Getting sabaki up to 8 is sufficient for Black.

If this variation is played out in this issue’s fuseki, White will extend to 14 in Dia. 30.
At the top, Black has built up strength with 1 and 3, but it is too close to the thickness he already has there to work effectively. White, however, has gained by scooping out 10 points in the corner. When he plays first at the bottom with 14, the game is even.

**B's Proposal**

B proposed the hane at 1 in Dia. 31. White's only answer is the crosscut at 2, which gives the same shape as the variation of the one-space high pincher shown in Dia. 32.

After the Black 'a'–White 'b' exchange in Dia. 33, Black can extend toward the center with 'c' or along the side at 'd'.

If Black extends at 1 in Dia. 40 instead of playing the 1–3 combination in Dia. 34, White gets a good move at 2. The idea behind Black 1 is to build up the center by treating the corner lightly.

Continuing with 1 in Dia. 41 is unreasonable. It is the move White is hoping for, as with 2 he sets up the squeeze in Dia. 42. When Black con-
nnects at 9 in Dia. 43, White can hane at 10, getting a comfortable position in the sequence to 15. (White 10 at 12 also looks possible.)

After White 2 in Dia. 44, Black should extend at 3, letting White block at 4. Although he loses points in the corner, he can use the strength he gains in the center for attack.

After Black 5 and White 6 in Dia. 45, White ‘a’ is a big move, since it revives the marked stone. Black 7 eliminates this aji, as well as forcing White to add a move in the corner. White first exchanges 8 for 9 in Dia. 46 (if Black cuts at ‘a’, White gets a strong shape with White ‘b’—Black ‘c’—White ‘d’), then eliminates the aji in the corner with 10 when Black captures with 9.

Without White 10, Black can live with the sequence in Dia. 47.

After Black 1 in Dia. 48, White might consider the tesuji of 2. If Black pushes up at 3 in Dia. 49, he will soon find that he has been completely outplayed in the sequence to 10. Instead of pushing up at 3, he must hane at 1 in Dia. 50. When White cuts, Black ataris at 3 and pushes down at 5. White has no good continuation.

Since the ladder in Dia. 34 favors White, Black must play the variation shown in Dia. 51 in this issue’s fuseki. This result is terrible for Black, for not only has White taken a large profit in the corner, he has encroached on the right side as well. Black, however, has built thickness at the top that only overlaps the thickness he already has there.
There are actually many situations in which a ko is not a ko. That is, the value of a ko is nil. A ko within an indisputably dead group is worthless; consider also two kos that remain only to be filled consecutively by opponents at the end of the game. And there is a go proverb that states that a ko at the beginning of a game is not a ko.

Other kos may lay claim to being valueless by virtue of the fact that they void the game, as is the case when three or more unresolvable ko battles trigger a draw. But this is rare. Not many players, either amateur or professional, will encounter this kind of ko more than once or twice in a lifetime. Even more rare are kos that forfeit or void a game as being illegally played. One may read of the mischief caused by such a ko on page 11 of GW23. In the fourth game of the 1980 Meijin match Cho Chikun captured a ko without making a ko threat, thereby nullifying the game.

But the kos alluded to in the title of this article are the rarest of all. They exist on the frontier of go theory like the speculations of advanced mathematics and depend upon the foundation of equivalent assumptions.

Challenging these assumptions is akin to questioning the validity of the law. In go the logic, or rather the illogic, of the rules is brought into question.

Go Seigen was well aware of these questions as he played White 2 in Dia. 1. This is not much of a ko threat but... is there a ko here at all?

White 2 in Dia. 1 is indeed considered to be the last move of the game, the first game of Go’s match with Honinbo Kunwa (Iwamoto Kaoru), June 1948. The rules of the Nihon Ki-in state that Black must capture the marked stone by playing at ‘a’. Go Seigen pointed out that White cannot possibly win this ko and has nowhere left to play.

The game was declared a 1- or 2-point White win. Dia. 2 shows a game that ended in a more subtle and more startling climax. Takagawa Kaku and Go Seigen are the players.

Go Seigen countered that the logical conclusion to such a ko would be the sequence in...
Dia. 4. His and Takagawa's reading was in agreement on this point. White takes the ko with 6 and answers Black 7 by filling a neutral point at 8. When Black captures the ko with 9 White exchanges 10 for Black 11 and retakes the ko. Now when Black fills a neutral point at 13 ... White passes.

In effect, White declares the game over and invites his opponent to play a move. Black takes the ko with 15, but White ignores this move and ends the ko with 20. This of course leaves a ko in the upper left corner ... or does it?

According to Go Seigen it does not: the ko in the upper left corner is not a ko.

If Black takes the ko with 21 in Dia. 5, White 22 forces Black to play 23. White then retakes the ko with 24. Now Black has no ko threat. Not only that, he has no move at all, not even an empty liberty he can fill in. If Black adds a stone to his own territory White can fill at 21 and win.

Is White not therefore entitled simply to remove the marked black stone from the board?

Go Seigen: 'I think it best not to create intricate provisions to the game of go. If all the liberties of a group are filled the group is taken off the board, a ko may not be retaken until a move is first played elsewhere, the side with the most territory wins; fundamental principles such as these are sufficient regulation. One desires simplicity in the rules. This will also aid in increasing the go population. Intricate rules are only manifestations of elaborate technique.

'The Chinese rules play everything out to its conclusion; there is no perception of irrationality. The Japanese rules produce situations such as a seki on the same board as a "bent four in the corner" ... or the provision that White must add a stone to his center area in Dia. 2 on the previous page. These problems do not stand to reason.

'If a one-move ko is thought to demand a preventative move, then the shape must be incomplete. Completing the shape, in the case of a yose ko also, is the necessity here. Stones are alive not only because they have eyes but because they can not be captured ... I hope that irrationality in the rules is corrected as soon as possible.'

The Chinese Rules

The Japanese system decides the game on the distribution of territory while the Chinese add the living stones one has used to surround that territory to the sum. Captured or dead stones are irrelevant to the result. (More on the Chinese rules in GW5, the Japanese rules in GW12.)

Calculating the result of Dia. 6 by the Japan-
ese method gives Black 8 points, White 7 points; Black wins by 1 point. By the Chinese method Black adds his 18 living stones to 7 points of territory = 25. This seven-line board contains 49 points, so the dividing line between the players is the 24.5 mark. Black, ahead by 0.5, wins by half a stone. (One Chinese stone is equal to two Japanese points. Counting only one side is fine. White = 24.) The half-way point on a 19-line board is 180.5. Notice that in Dia. 6 there are no empty liberties, but if there were they could bear living stones and so every one of them would be filled. Seki and other special situations aside, the game is fought the same way under either set of rules, the Chinese or the Japanese.

The difference between the rules is most marked in the case of the 'bent four in the corner'. Under the Japanese rules White is unconditionally dead (actually, if Black moves to capture White with 'a' in Dia. 7, a ko results); under the Chinese rules adding stones to one's territory is no loss (territory is decreased but living stones increased), so there is no obstacle to eliminating any ko material in one's territory and the forced capture of the corner. When in doubt, play it out.

**Why Not Eliminate the Irrational in Go?**

*by Kudo Norio 9-dan, O Meien 6-dan and Murakami Akira*

**Bad Aji at the End of the Game**

Murakami: The defects in the present rules have been known for a long time. Attempts to correct the defects have failed because they treat the symptoms, not the root cause, which is the nature of the Japanese rules themselves. While this tinkering with the rules has been going on, the Chinese have come abreast with the Japanese in the go world and the focus is now directed toward the rationality of the Chinese rules.

The Chinese rules are based on the outcome of adversaries plugging as many stones into the 361-point go board as possible. Of course, the side that controls the most territory can plug more stones into the board. The game itself is conducted the same under either set of rules.

However, in adding up the score the Chinese rules take into consideration the stones on the board plus the territory, the Japanese rules the captured stones plus the territory. This is just using different methods to arrive at the same conclusion, though. If the same number of stones are played on the board, the captured stones will be equivalent as well.

Rather than debate how to effect a piecemeal revision of the Japanese rules, the time is ripe for straightforward consideration of adoption of the Chinese rules. To that end we have sought out the opinions of Kudo 9-dan and O 6-dan.

Put as simply as possible, what are the defects in the present rules? What kinds of problems are the most prevalent?

Kudo: Of course it is the question of adding moves at the end of the game. I myself have experienced this sort of thing many times; when the liberties are filled up there are occasions when a damaging play results. Sometimes one's opponent is unaware of the trouble.

O: Until the game is officially declared ended this sort of thing is fair game.

Kudo: By the Japanese custom the game has already ended before the liberty at 'a' is filled.

O: I see.

Murakami: How is this problem resolved?

Kudo: Well, that's not clear. Usually when any kind of problem arises it is handled by consensus. Except, among amateurs this is not much of a problem. If the shape in Dia. 1 appeared, the stronger player would instruct his opponent to add a move, in the spirit of counselling a family.
member. But it would be funny for this kind of advice to be given among professionals.

Murakami: The perception of the rules changes with the times; the present rules were promulgated in 1949 when the go world was more like a family. What kinds of problems have you been a party to, O?

O: I have seen games that have ended with both players overlooking 1- and 2-point moves. This has happened four or five times. To get right to the point, a game might end without either player noticing the 1-point move at ‘a’ in Dia. 2; when this happened, White was awarded the point at ‘b’. However, when the players have neglected to play ‘a’ in Dia. 3, ‘b’ would not become White’s territory. That’s because ‘b’ in Dia. 2 more or less constitutes eye space for White.

Dia. 2

Dia. 3

Murakami: Who decided that?

O: That’s just the way it is done. One time Kobayashi Satoru and O Mosei were playing; it was a half-point game. The official observer and others consulted and came to that decision.

Kudo: I have never heard of such a thing!

Murakami: Perhaps the most common occurrence is the one mentioned before, that is, one side is unaware of the existence of a defect that will appear when the liberties are filled. I myself witnessed a game in the Kisei tournament between Shiraishi 9-dan and Ishigure 9-dan where a one-move ko or something would have materialized within Ishigure’s territory after all the liberties were filled at the end of the game. Shiraishi realized the truth but Ishigure did not. However, Shiraishi had no chance to spring the trap. He could not very well wait until after the liberties were filled willy-nilly at the end of the game to make his move and yet he did not want to tip his hand by saying anything. The game ended with Shiraishi mumbling to himself while he stared at the area in question. Ishigure mentioned afterward that he knew that a potential problem existed but read out that he was safe and had not intended to add a move there. Ishigure won that game by 6½ points but chances are that he would have lost if he had been forced to fight that ko.

Kudo: I know about that game. There was indeed bad aji at the end, but the problem was there was no opportunity to exploit it. The rules do not deal with this.

O: If it were required that both sides fill in the liberties by turns to ensure that no play exists before declaring the game ended, there would be no problem.

Kudo: Yes, yes, as in the World Amateur Championship.

Murakami: But the Japanese custom is to regard the empty liberties as meaningless. Aesthetically it goes against the grain to fill them.

Kudo: Yes, but we are talking about eliminating this problem completely. At the very least, the game should not be considered finished until all the liberties have been filled in and necessary defensive moves made. This much could be done for a start, since proposing the immediate adoption of the Chinese rules would entail various complications.

The Japanese Rules and Precedents

Murakami: What other problems come up?

Kudo: Problems that arise are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. If there is no precedent for dealing with a problematic situation it must be solved through consultations. This is the major defect in the Japanese rules.

O: An example is the ‘bent four in the corner.’

Kudo: There are several theoretical situations
without precedents in the record. For instance, assuming the ko material favors Black in Dia. 4, White cannot initiate a ko in the corner since he cannot win it and it is usual for the game to end with this situation left as it is. In that case, how many moves should Black be required to add here in order to remove White from the board? A scrupulous appraisal would have Black adding the three moves at ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’, but...

O: The rules state that ‘where a direct ko exists, moves must be added to deal with it,’ so obviously three moves are necessary here.

Kudo: There are two opinions about this. That of O and the other view that holds that one move is sufficient. Actually, I showed this position to several players yesterday and most felt that one move is enough. The rationale is that a direct ko would result if White plays in the corner; in that case one move by Black would suffice to settle the matter.

O: But White will not initiate that action...

Kudo: All I am saying is that I found opinion divided. But if this position came up in a title match there’d be some real arguments.

Regarding the Chinese Rules

Murakami: Turning to a discussion of the Chinese rules, perhaps O would explain in a word the nature of those rules.

O: In short, the object is to surround and capture one’s opponent’s stones while ensuring that more of one’s own living stones remain on the board at the end of the game.

Since coming to Japan to study go I have gotten used to playing by the Japanese rules but I think that if one must explain the game of go to someone who knows nothing about it, the Chinese rules stand alone. The side that has the most living stones on the board at the end wins; it is as simple as that.
White is entitled to add more stones to the board and so the Chinese rules are better for him.

0: This will come up in about one game a year. Other than this, if White fills in the last liberty in the game the result will be the same as under the Japanese rules, but if Black does the Chinese rules are one point better for him.

Kudo: That is because if White plays last both sides have played an equal number of moves, while if Black plays last he has played one extra move. That will not change the actual result, but the explanation is complicated, so we will omit it.

Playing It Out

Murakami: What I would like to know, and it is an important point, is why there are no defects in the Chinese rules. First of all, explain the situation we started this discussion with, the case where moves appear as liberties are filled.

Kudo: As we noted before, an empty liberty is also worth one point, so both sides take turns filling them; if a play exists it will be taken care of during the natural course of events.

Murakami: So the situation 0 described before, in which both players overlooked a one-point play, will not occur under the Chinese rules.

O: No, it will occur. Under the Japanese rules it is easy to overlook such things.

Kudo: Perhaps most important is the fact that under the Chinese rules it is not necessary to rely on precedents to settle a dispute.

O: That is because everything is decided by playing it out. Under the Japanese rules play stops at a certain point. That creates problems.

Kudo: One side might claim a group is dead, the other that it is alive. The side that insists the group is dead may demonstrate that fact, but under the Japanese rules expending moves on a dead group loses points.

Murakami: Under the Chinese rules adding moves in one's territory is no loss at all. So if there is ever any question it can be readily resolved.

O: In the case of a 'bent four in the corner' one can go about eliminating any ko material within one's territory and then capture the corner; the matter is decided without resort to any rule.

Kudo: One often hears the Chinese rules criticized because of cases like the position in Dia. 6. When White plays 1, Black answers at 2 from a sense of uneasiness although in fact there is no play here. Under the Japanese rules Black incurs a one-point loss while under the Chinese rules there is no loss. Doesn't it detract from the game that a dim-witted play such as Black 2 should not cost anything? In reality this is a serious misconstruction of the situation. Under the Chinese rules White 1 is worth one point while Black 2 is worthless. On top of that, White has gotten to play 1 in sente. So under the Chinese rules also one must keep one's wits about one while playing.

Murakami: In any event, the important thing to understand is that fundamentally the Japanese and the Chinese rules are the same.

O: Under the Chinese rules also, one bases one's appraisal of the situation upon the balance of territory, so the essence is the same.

The Value of an Empty Liberty

Murakami: Assuming the Nihon Ki-in seriously
takes up the question of adopting the Chinese rules, I would imagine most players would oppose such an action. Can you tell me why?

Kudo: First, from a lack of understanding of the Chinese rules and an unwillingness to take the trouble to learn about them. I myself have yet to play a game under the Chinese rules and should it come to that point I could find myself nonplussed. Once one gets used to it though, nothing could be easier.

O: For someone who has played all his life under the Chinese rules, the tendency is to resist changing to another system also.

Murakami: The perception of the value of an empty liberty is different. From the past the ‘beauty of the unfilled liberty’ has been spoken of in the Japanese go world.

Kudo: The feeling is that one should not play on a worthless point. But there is a serious misunderstanding here. Consider Dia. 7. Suppose there is a one-move approach ko on the board and Black has more ko threats; it seems the game might be fated to end without Black’s resolving that ko. But filling an empty liberty with White 1 and thereby creating ko threats at ‘a’ is a strong move. If the opponent is compelled to add a move to resolve that one-move approach ko then White 1 is by no means a worthless move.

Murakami: Recently, Chinese players have been active in promoting go around the world and it seems that soon world opinion will be swayed towards adopting the Chinese rules.

Kudo: It is already happening. At this point Japan is still a bit stronger so that explains why the Japanese rules are prevalent.

O: As for myself, I do not care which rules are used but rather than being forced to change by circumstances I think the Nihon Ki-in should lead the way on this issue.

Kudo: That would nip a lot of problems in the bud. I would like to see those questions about plays materializing as liberties are filled resolved as soon as possible. Let’s hope this article aids in facilitating the process.

('Kido', April 1986. Translated by Bob Terry.)

Finesse or Brute Force?

Readers may recall the games we presented under the above title in GW35. Here is another contribution to the debate, a game in which both players indulged in unbridled aggression. White is Muramatsu Ryuichi 4-dan (age 23) and Black is Yo Kagen 2-dan (age 16), a member of the strong Taiwanese contingent at the Nihon Ki-in (his brother is a shodan).

Black got off to a good start up to 37, but he overreached himself when he attacked at 39. He should have played Black ‘a’, White 62, Black ‘b’, White 43, Black 74. That would have put him ahead.

Black 47. If at 48, White plays ‘a’ and wins the semeai. The continuation to 78 is forced. If next Black ‘c’ through White ‘f’, then Black connects at 66 but collapses after White ‘g’ through ‘o’.

Of course, technique wins out in the end, but this kind of spirited attempt to overwhelm the opponent with sheer power makes for an entertaining game for the spectator.

('Go Weekly', 24 June 1986)
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